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ABSTRACT
Auditors play a major role in corporate governance and
capital markets. Ex ante, auditors facilitate firms’ access to
finance by fostering trust among public investors. Ex post,
auditors can prevent misbehavior and prevent financial fraud by
corporate insiders. In order to fulfill these goals, however, in
addition to having the adequate knowledge and expertise,
auditors must perform their functions in an independent manner.
Unfortunately, auditors are often subject to conflicts of interest,
for example, resulting from the provision of nonaudit services but
also because of the mere fact of being hired and paid by the
audited company. Therefore, even if auditors act independently,
investors may have reason to think otherwise. Policymakers and
scholars around the world have attempted to solve the auditor
independence puzzle through a variety of mechanisms, including
prohibitions and rotation requirements. More recent proposals
have also included breaking up audit firms and the
empowerment of shareholders. This Article argues that none of
these solutions is entirely convincing. Drawing from corporate
governance, law and economics, and accounting literature, this
Article proposes a new model to solve the auditor independence
puzzle. Our proposal rests on four pillars. First, this Article
argues that, in the context of controlled firms, auditors should be
elected with a majority-of-the-minority vote. Second, while
auditors in many jurisdictions are subject to certain temporal
prohibitions to be hired by previous clients, the Article proposes
that the length of these temporal prohibitions should be extended.
Moreover, regulators should also restrict the type of services
potentially provided to the audit client. Third, policymakers must
pay closer attention to the internal governance and compensation
systems of audit firms. The Article argues that increased
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transparency of audit firms is essential to enhance the
independence of auditors. Finally, studies have shown that audit
committees often fail to perform their monitoring functions, a
major reason being the influence of corporate insiders on the
committee. For this reason, we propose to increase the power and
presence of public investors in the audit committee.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Auditing has long been understood as an important element of
corporate governance. Both US securities law1 and European Union
(EU) Company Law2 have long required financial statements of
publicly traded corporations to be reviewed by independent
professionals, and EU law (and the law of its member states), as well
as other jurisdictions in Asia and Latin America, has extended this
requirement also to larger privately held firms.3 Virtually all major
jurisdictions provide for a mandatory audit of the financial statements
of publicly traded firms.
The external audit, performed by a professionally trained
Certified Public Accountant (CPA), is intended to provide another layer
of review in order to ensure the accuracy of a firm’s financial
statements, thus facilitating a more information efficient pricing of the
firm’s securities in the capital market and enabling investors to gain
sufficient confidence to purchase the company’s securities. 4 Over the
past thirty years, however, public confidence in auditors has
repeatedly received severe blows in the public eye: many major
jurisdictions have seen accounting scandals involving fraudulent
conduct by management that auditors did not discover. The most

1.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a)(2) (2018) (requiring
“such annual reports (and such copies thereof), certified if required by the rules and
regulations of the Commission by independent public accountants, and such quarterly
reports (and such copies thereof), as the Commission may prescribe.”); Rule 14a-3(b), 17
C.F.R. § 240.14a-3 (1968) (requiring the disclosure of audited financial statements with
proxy statements of an issuer); Form 10-K, 17 C.F.R. § 249.310, Item 8 (1992) (requiring
financial statements in accordance with regulation S-X); Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R.
§ 210.1-02(a)(1) (2002) (defining the audit report required by the SEC).
2.
Directive 2013/34/EU, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26
June 2013 on the Annual Financial Statements, Consolidated Financial Statements and
Related Reports of Certain Types of Undertakings, Amending Directive 2006/43/EC, of
the European Parliament and of the Council and Repealing Council Directives
78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC (“Codified Accounting Directive”), art. 34, 2013 O.J. (L 182)
19 (requiring financial statements of certain companies to be audited, and replacing
older directives with identical requirements).
3.
In Asia and Latin America, audits are usually required of both public
companies and large private companies. In Singapore, for example, sections 201(8) and
205 (C) of the Companies Act requires companies to audit their financial statements
unless an exemption for ‘small company’ applies. Similar requirements have been
adopted in Hong Kong since the enactment of a new Companies Ordinance in 2014. In
Latin America, for example, see Law No. 11638/07, amending the Brazilian Corporations
Law No. 6404/76 of 1976 (imposing audit obligations for large private companies), art.
203 of the Colombian Commercial Code (requiring audited financial statement for all
companies), and art. 13, para. 2, of the Law 43/1990 (establishing exemptions for small
companies).
4.
See, e.g., John Armour, Gérard Hertig, & Hideki Kanda, Transactions with
Creditors, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL
APPROACH 122 (John Armour et al. eds., 3d ed. 2017) [hereinafter Armour et al.,
Transactions with Creditors] (discussing how auditors lower costs of capital by screening
financial statements).
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famous examples are Enron and WorldCom, which blew up in the
United States in 2001 and 2002 and led to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002.5 In Europe, the Parmalat scandal in Italy became known in 2003,
where auditors had failed to uncover massive tunneling transactions
between the firm and members of the family controlling it. 6 The
European Union responded to this and other scandals with a
completely new Audit Directive in 2006, 7 which was occasionally
dubbed “Euro-SOX” because it took considerable inspiration from US
law.8 Its requirements were expanded with a major amendment in
20149 and supplemented with an EU Audit Regulation 10 applying to
publicly traded firms and some others.11
Auditing thus remains in a state of perennial reform. This Article
attempts to shed light on the trajectory of these reforms across
countries and suggests a number of new avenues policymakers might
explore in the coming years, drawing mainly from the debates in the
United States and Europe. Part II describes the economics of auditor
independence, drawing on two models developed in the law and

5.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as
U.S.C. §§ 7201–7266 (2018)); see, e.g., Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the
Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1544–45 (2005).
6.
JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 89–90 (2006) [hereinafter COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS]; Guido Ferrarini &
Paolo Giudici, Financial Scandals and the Role of Private Enforcement: The Parmalat
Case, in AFTER ENRON 159 (John Armour et al. eds., 2006); John C. Coffee, Jr., A Theory
of Corporate Scandals: Why the US and Europe Differ, 21 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 198,
206–07 (2005) [hereinafter Coffee, Corporate Scandals]; Andrea Melis, Corporate
Governance Failures: to What Extent is Parmalat a Particularly Italian Case?, 13 CORP.
GOV. 478 (2005).
7.
Directive 2006/43/EC, of the European Parliament and the Council of 17 May
2006 on Statutory Audits of Annual Accounts and Consolidated Accounts, Amending
Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC and Repealing Council Directive
84/253/EEC, 2006 O.J. (L 157) 87 [hereinafter EU Audit Directive 2006]. The original
Audit Directive or Eighth Company Law Directive of 1984 had essentially only set forth
minimum qualification standard for members of the accounting profession. Directive
84/253/EEC of April 10, 1984, 1984 O.J. (L 126) 20.
8.
See, e.g., Anne-Marie Anderson & Parveen P. Gupta, Corporate Governance:
Does One Size Fit All?, 24 J. CORP. FIN & ACCT. 51, 52 (2013).
9.
Directive 2014/56/EU, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16
April 2014 amending Directive 2006/43/EC on Statutory Audits of Annual Accounts and
Consolidated Accounts, O.J. (L 159) 196 [hereinafter EU Audit Directive 2014]. All
references to Audit Directive will be to the consolidated version that incorporates the
2014 amendments.
10. See, e.g., Clyde Stoltenberg et al., A Comparative Analysis of Post-SarbanesOxley Corporate Governance Developments in the US and European Union: The Impact
of Tensions Created by Extraterritorial Application of Section 404, 53 AM. J. COMP. L.
457, 481 n.155 (2005).
11. Regulation (EU) No 537/2014, of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 16 April 2014 on Specific Requirements Regarding Statutory Audit of Public-Interest
Entities and Repealing Commission Decision 2005/909/EC, art. 1, 2014 O.J. (L 158) 77
(defining its scope of application) [hereinafter EU Audit Regulation]; EU Audit Directive
2014, supra note 9, at art. 2(13) (defining “public-interest entities” as including publicly
traded firms, banks, insurance companies, and some others).
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economics literature and the accounting literature, concluding with
theoretical explanations of why audits sometimes fail, and why the
audit industry needs to be regulated. Part III evaluates traditional
responses to the auditor independence puzzle. Part IV discusses
proposals that have been discussed recently. Part V highlights
proposals that so far have received little attention and suggests some
new ideas for reform. Part VI summarizes and concludes.
II. THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE
A. Auditing and Capital Markets
At least in theory, auditing serves a simple and useful purpose in
publicly traded firms. If auditing increases the confidence investors
have in the fact that financial statements fairly represent a company’s
financial position, they will put a premium on securities by issuers
providing audited financial statements. Correspondingly, companies
seeking to tap capital markets should seek to commit to their investors
by voluntarily providing audited financial statements to investors in
order to reduce their cost of capital.12 Auditing thus fits neatly into the
agency model of the firm: agency cost is created by the conflict of
interest between the manager and the outside shareholder.13 In classic
agency theory, there are three types of costs: monitoring cost, bonding
cost, and the deadweight loss resulting from the (remaining)
information asymmetries.14 Within this relationship, an audit could be
seen as a monitoring mechanism implemented by the principal. 15
Given that auditors are usually selected by management, auditors can
be seen as a bonding mechanism introduced by the agent to credibly
testify that they are doing their job well and reduce agency cost. 16
Managers should benefit from this, given that it is typically in their
interest to lower the firm’s cost of capital. 17 Indeed, historically,
precursors to auditing existed in medieval merchant’s guilds, the
earliest overseas trade joint stock companies, and coalesced into a
profession dealing with the financial statements of publicly traded

12. Ross L. Watts & Jerold L. Zimmermann, Agency Problems, Auditing, and the
Theory of the Firm: Some Evidence, 26 J.L. & ECON. 613, 614–15 (1983); see also Andrew
F. Tuch, Multiple Gatekeepers, 96 VA. L. REV. 1583, 1595 (2010).
13. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 312
(1976).
14. Id. at 308.
15. Rick Antle, The Auditor as an Economic Agent, 20 J. ACCT. RES. 503, 512
(1982).
16. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 13, at 338–39; Watts & Zimmerman,
supra note 12, at 613–15.
17. See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Accounting: Some Economic
Issues, 52 BROOK. L. REV. 1051, 1052 (1987).
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firms in the United Kingdom and the United States in the late
nineteenth century before legal requirements were enacted.18 Even
today, firms not subject to a mandatory audit sometimes voluntarily
submit to one, for example at the behest of creditors.19 A credible audit
can send a signal to investors that a firm’s financial statements fairly
present its financial position. Theory suggests that, in the absence of a
credible commitment mechanism, all firms will have an incentive to
overinflate their earnings.20 In light of this rationale, one would
suspect that under market conditions, auditing as an institution
should develop organically and evolve to an efficient design.
So much for the theory. Auditing, however, is not a neutral
technology because the auditor is an independent economic actor
reacting to his own incentive structure. Thus, the auditor in turn
creates agency costs.21 First, the auditor might “shirk” (i.e., by not
conducting the audit with the thoroughness demanded by generally
accepted auditing standards (GAAS)).22 In this case, the problem is one
of what is called “audit quality” in accounting terminology.23 Second,
the auditor might collude with management to the detriment of
outsiders24 (e.g., by failing to report a violation of generally accepted
accounting principles (GAAP)). In this case, the issue is one of “auditor
independence.”
Investors may recognize these problems and act accordingly.
Without corrective mechanisms in place, they might not trust financial
statements, and the firm’s shares would trade at a discount. One might
argue that firms should, therefore, have the incentive to hire only
auditors that comply with independence standards suitable to the

18. Watts & Zimmermann, supra note 12, at 613, 616–33; see also Paul G.
Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. CHI. L. REV.
1047, 1086 (1995).
19. See, e.g., Elisabeth Dedman et al., The Demand for Audit in Private Firms:
Recent Large-Sample Evidence from the UK, 23 EUR. ACCT. REV. 1, 12–13 (2014)
(analyzing a comprehensive sample of privately-held firms that were no longer required
to have an audit, the majority of which still retained one).
20. See, e.g., Stephen Choi, Market Lessons for Gatekeepers, 92 NW. U. L. Rev.
916, 922, 927 (1998).
21. See Antle, supra note 15, at 512.
22. However, note that US courts have not considered compliance with GAAP to
be a safe harbor shielding auditors from liability, in spite of protestations to the contrary
from the accounting profession. United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796, 805 (2d Cir. 1969).
See Fred Kuhar, The Criminal Liability of Public Accountants: A Study of United States
v. Simon, 46 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 564, 593–94 (1971) (listing eight defense witnesses
drawn from the leadership of the accounting profession).
23. Jere R. Francis, What Do We Know About Audit Quality?, 36 BRIT. ACCT. REV.
345, 346 (2004) (describing audit quality as a failure to meet “minimum legal and
professional requirements”).
24. See, e.g., Daron Acemoglu & Miles B. Gietzman, Auditor Independence,
Incomplete Contracts and the Role of Legal Liability, 6 EUR. ACCT. REV. 355, 356 (1997);
see also Linda Elizabeth DeAngelo, Auditor Independence, ‘Low Balling’, and Disclosure
Regulation, 3 J. ACCT. & ECON. 113, 115 (1981) [hereinafter DeAngelo, Auditor
Independence].
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specific firm. Arguably, the existence of various market failures seems
to justify the regulation of auditors. 25 First, investors might not
effectively punish audit firms for malpractice, even when trust is both
the goal of, and the basis for, the audit business. 26 Audit firms that do
not fully internalize the costs of their decisions will be subject to moral
hazard.27 Second, the existence of asymmetries of information, rational
apathy, and collective action problems faced by outside investors may
also reduce the incentives potentially faced by audit firms to take steps
to minimize ex ante the risk of committing misbehavior or providing
poor-quality work.28 Third, the fact patterns creating independence
problems for auditors and reducing their incentives to do a good job are
often highly complex and hard to understand for investors. 29
Sophisticated investors will surely recognize that an audit is generally
beneficial, but they may not be able to see through independence issues
in all cases, given that the complexity of the relationship between the
auditor and the audited firm may at times be difficult to understand.
For example, a repeated engagement of the same audit firm with a
particular client may compromise the auditor’s independence. At the
same time, audit quality might benefit from the auditor’s greater
familiarity with the client. While sophisticated investors are likely

25. See JOHN ARMOUR ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 51–52
(2016) (defining market failures as situations where markets do not achieve the
economically efficient outcomes with which they are generally associated, and discussing
that where such failures arise, there is a prima facie case for actions to be taken to correct
the failures, provided the benefits of regulation exceed its costs); see also id. at 55–61
(suggesting that financial regulation is justified as a response to those market failures
existing in financial markets, particularly asymmetries of information, imperfect
competition, public goods, and negative externalities).
26. Regarding the (often lacking) effectiveness of reputational sections, see infra
notes 44–58 and accompanying text.
27. See, e.g., Stavros Gadinis & Coby Mangels, Collaborative Gatekeepers, 73
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 798, 817–20 (2016) (discussing the low probability of detection of
gatekeeper wrongdoing).
28. See Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV.
520, 526–29 (1990) (surveying reasons for shareholder passivity, rational apathy, and
collective action problems). But see Anita Anand & Niamh Moloney, Reform of the Audit
Process and the Role of Shareholder Voice: Transatlantic Perspectives, 5 EUR. BUS. ORG.
L. REV. 223, 236–40 (2004) (arguing for a greater role of institutional investors in auditor
selection).
29. On the issue of “information overload” among investors, which may apply to
complex questions of auditor independence, see, e.g., Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the
Light: Information Overload and Its Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH U.
L.Q. 417, 444–49 (2003); Susanna Kim Ripken, The Dangers and Drawbacks of the
Disclosure Antidote: Toward a More Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation, 58
BAYLOR L. REV. 139, 160–63 (2006); see also Alex Edmans, Mirko S. Heinle, & Chong
Huang, The Real Costs of Financial Efficiency When Some Information Is Soft, 20 REV.
FINANCE 2151, 2152–53 (2016) (suggesting that the presence of soft, unverifiable
information may result in inefficiencies and distortions in decision-making); Julia M.
Puaschunder, Nudgitize Me! A Behavioral Finance Approach to Minimize Losses and
Maximize Profits from Heuristics and Biases, 18 J. ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOL. 46, 53–54
(2018).
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aware of both effects, they will not necessarily know how these costs
and benefits compare in the specific case, given that this assessment
would require considerable information about the firm. Overall, since
the auditor’s work can affect firms’ access to finance and the
development of capital markets, and markets are not likely to price the
benefits of audit services accurately, there are powerful reasons to
regulate auditors.
In addition, the failure of audit firms to properly perform their job
may create some negative externalities, not only as the result of the
money potentially lost by investors but also—and perhaps more
importantly—for the lack of trust generated in the system. After a
financial scandal, investors may be more skeptical about investing in
public companies in general.30 The information disclosed in financial
statements has public good character, meaning that the issuer and its
investors do not fully internalize its benefits. 31 Because of network
effects resulting from the comparison of financial statements and the
integrity of the system overall, without mandatory rules the amount of
information produced will likely be smaller than socially optimal. 32
Likely, firms would therefore not have the incentive to give full weight
to independence when selecting an auditor. This may help explain why
auditor independence regulation has long attempted to err on the side
of caution by addressing not only “independence in fact” but also mere
“independence in appearance.”33
The proposal in this Article thus follows the conventional wisdom
that considerable regulation of auditor independence is desirable. It
seems important to remain cognizant of the fact that there may not be
a single right solution for the tradeoffs inherent in the regulatory

30. Stephanie Yates Rauterkus & Kyojik “Roy” Song, Auditor's Reputation and
Equity Offerings: The Case of Arthur Andersen, 34 FIN. MGMT. 121, 121–35 (2005)
(showing the negative reaction of Arthur Anderson’s worsening reputation on seasoned
equity offerings, compared to those of non-Andersen clients. Namely, the authors found
that the median firm in their sample lost $31.4 million more than a non-Andersen
client.). See generally Sharad Asthana et al., Audit Firm Reputation and Client Stock
Price Reactions: Evidence from the Enron Experience (Working Paper, 2003) (showing
that Andersen's clients suffered significant value losses).
31. See, e.g., Allen Ferrell, The Case for Mandatory Disclosure in Securities
Regulation around the World, 2 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 81 (2007); see also Luca
Enriques et al., Corporate Law and Securities Markets, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE
LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH, supra note 4, at 243, 246–47; Holger
Daske et al., Mandatory IFRS Reporting Around the World: Early Evidence on the
Economic Consequences, 46 J. ACCT. RES. 1085 (2008); Allen Ferrell, Mandated
Disclosure and Stock Returns: Evidence from the Over the Counter Market, 36 J. LEGAL
STUD. 213 (2007).
32. See Luca Enriques & Sergio Gilotta, Disclosure and Financial Market
Regulation, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 511, 521–22 (Niamh
Moloney et al. eds., 2015); Merritt Fox, The Issuer Choice Debate, 2 THEORETICAL INQ.
LAW 563 (2001); Enriques et al., supra note 31, at 246.
33. See, e.g., Robert A. Prentice & David B. Spence, Sarbanes-Oxley as Quack
Corporate Governance: How Wise Is the Received Wisdom, 95 GEO. L.J. 1843, 1882 (2007).
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choice across all firms. In addition to addressing highly obvious
conflicts of interest, the proposal outlined in Part V thus emphasizes
the role of the audit committee and disclosures intended to reduce
market failures inhibiting private choice.
***
Understanding auditor independence requires an analysis of
incentives faced by auditors. Law and economics theory and accounting
theory have each developed models exploring the incentives of the
auditor in this context. While the gatekeeper model (from law and
economics) would at first glance seem to suggest that auditors have an
incentive to perform audits independently, the quasi-rent model (from
accounting theory) illustrates the incentives of an auditor to retain a
client, and hence an inherent danger to independent audits. Each of
the two models will be discussed below (subpart IIB describes the
gatekeeper model, and IIC the quasi-rent model), and subsequently a
reconciliation between the two models is given (subpart IID). This
synthesis provides a better basis for policy issues related to auditing.
B. Auditors as Gatekeepers
The legal literature has long described auditors as
“gatekeepers.”34 This term was originally coined by Reinier Kraakman,
who used it more generally to describe intermediaries —third parties—
“who are able to disrupt misconduct by withholding their cooperation
from wrongdoers” in a business law context.35 Shareholders and other
users of financial statements expect financial statements to provide a
fair presentation of the financial position of the company and rely on
them when making an investment decision. The firm’s top managers
ultimately bear the responsibility for drawing up financial statements,
but often have incentives to shed a particularly favorable light on their
company’s financial situation, including managerial compensation and
the evaluation of their performance by the market and investors.36 A

34. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge
of Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301 (2004) [hereinafter Coffee,
Gatekeeper Failure]; Tamar Frankel, Accountant’s Independence: The Recent Dilemma,
2000 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 261 (2000); Sung Hui Kim, Gatekeepers Inside Out, 21 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 411, 424 (2008).
35. Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party
Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53, 53 (1986) [hereinafter Kraakman,
Gatekeepers].
36. Under the semi-strong version of the efficient capital markets hypothesis,
publicly available information such as financial statements is reflected by the stock
price. See Martin Gelter, Global Securities Litigation and Enforcement, in GLOBAL
SECURITIES LITIGATION AND ENFORCEMENT 1, 69–70 (Pierre-Henri Conac et al. eds.,
2019); ARMOUR ET AL., supra note 25, at 102–05 (2016).
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number of mechanisms seek to balance these incentives and to keep
management honest. Most of all, securities law provides for civil
liability, regulatory enforcement actions, and criminal penalties, which
in combination aim at rectifying inaccurate disclosures and at
deterring managerial wrongdoing.37 However, the more dire the
situation in the firm becomes, and the stronger the incentives for
managers to lie to investors by embellishing their financial statements,
the less likely they are to set appropriate incentives to report
truthfully. It is not always possible to deter wrongdoing with
penalties.38 For example, the likelihood of detection may be very small,
and managers who are obviously biased analysts of their own firm’s
financial situation may underestimate it further. Penalties may be
uncertain and implemented with low probability, and far in the future.
The key point in the gatekeeper strategy is that the auditor (or
other gatekeeper) does not have the same high-powered incentives as
the person with the primary obligation. 39 Because the auditor’s
payment or career does not hinge on the same incentives as the
managers’, potential sanctions will dissuade an auditor more easily
than a manager because she has a lot to lose but little to gain from
wrongdoing.40 A gatekeeper strategy is effective when there is a large
difference in relative cost of deterrence (i.e., when the firm’s managers
are hard to deter compared to the auditor). 41
Gatekeeper theory tends to emphasize two deterrent factors:42
First, a gatekeeper can be held liable by the intended beneficiaries of
her activity.43 Second, and possibly more importantly, the literature
often defines gatekeepers as reputational intermediaries. 44 As repeat
players, gatekeepers vie for additional professional engagements. 45
Once the beneficiaries of the gatekeeper’s activity learn that a

37. See Gelter, supra note 36, at 33–39, 46–51, 51–96 (surveying regulatory,
criminal and civil enforcement of securities law around the world).
38. See, e.g., Choi, supra note 20, at 920 (“third-party screening for fraud has the
most value when substitute antifraud mechanisms are at their weakest”); Coffee,
Gatekeeper Failure, supra note 34, at 308, 309–10.
39. See, e.g., Sharon Hannes, Compensating for Executive Compensation: The
Case for Gatekeeper Incentive Pay, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 385, 407 (2010) (“gatekeepers are
unaffected by the same perverse incentive structures that drive corporate insiders”).
40. Kraakman, Gatekeepers, supra note 35, at 70.
41. See John C. Coffee, Jr. Understanding Enron: It’s About the Gatekeepers,
Stupid, 57 BUS. LAW. 1403, 1405 (2002) [hereinafter Coffee, Understanding Enron]; Choi,
supra note 20, at 920.
42. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Acquiescent Gatekeeper: Reputational Intermediaries,
Auditor Independence and the Governance of Accounting 1, 8 (Columbia Law Sch. Ctr. of
L. & Econ. Stud., Working Paper No. 191, 2001) [hereinafter Coffee, Acquiescent
Gatekeeper].
43. Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal
Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857, 891 (1984); Kim, supra note 34, at 426–27.
44. See, e.g., Gadinis & Mangels, supra note 27, at 809–10; Kim, supra note 34,
at 423–24.
45. Kraakman, Gatekeepers, supra note 35, at 94.
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gatekeeper lacks integrity, her report will lose much of its value. 46
Some studies have in fact identified a negative impact on the stock
prices of clients audited by accounting firms involved in well-publicized
accounting scandals.47 A rational gatekeeper should therefore be
incentivized by the desire to keep their reputation pristine. 48 The risk
of losing a large number of clients49 and maybe even one’s entire
professional standing should in theory vastly outweigh anything a
dishonest client might be able to offer to a corrupt, wealth-maximizing
auditor.50
The exit of an accounting firm from the market due to scandal is
an extreme version of loss of reputation. Famously, Arthur Anderson,
one of the “Big 5” accounting firms at the time, collapsed during the
Enron crisis.51 After its initial conviction for obstruction of justice, the
firm was no longer allowed to audit publicly traded firms because of
the felony conviction.52 Consequently, despite the subsequent reversal
of the conviction by the U.S. Supreme Court, the firm had lost its
reputational basis as well as its staff that had migrated to other
firms,53 and it was facing securities class actions. 54 However, it is not
clear if a large firm has ever left the market exclusively because of loss
of reputation. Laventhol & Horvath, a large firm in the second tier just
below what was then the “Big 8,” exited because of money damage

46. Coffee, Acquiescent Gatekeeper, supra note 42, at 9; see also Watts &
Zimmerman, supra note 12, at 615 (pointing out that the probability of breaches being
reported needs to be greater than zero for the audit to reduce agency costs of
management).
47. See William R. Baber et al., Client Security Price Reactions to the Laventhol
and Horwath Bankruptcy, 33 J. ACCT. RES. 385, 388–90 (1995) (showing price reactions
to the Laventhol bankruptcy); Paul K. Chaney & Kirk L. Philpich, Shredded Reputation:
The Cost of Audit Failure, 40 J. ACCT. RES. 1221 (2002) (showing reactions of market
prices of Anderson other than Enron). But see Mark DeFond & Jieying Zhang, A Review
of Archival Auditing Research, 58 J. ACCT. & ECON. 275, 297 (2014) (noting that the
market reaction may have been influenced by oil price changes).
48. Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure, supra note 34, at 309–10; Gadinis & Mangels,
supra note 27, at 811 (noting the limited role of regulatory sanctions in light of
reputational incentives according to the theory); Tuch, supra note 12, at 1596.
49. Arthur Anderson had 2,300 audit clients prior to Enron. See Coffee,
Gatekeeper Failure, supra note 34, at 310.
50. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF CORPORATE LAW 282 (1991).
51. Kathleen F. Brickey, Andersen's Fall from Grace, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 917, 917
(2003).
52. SEC Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e) (2004).
53. Prosecutors indicted Anderson for obstruction of justice on a single count of
witness tampering in March 2002. Then the US Supreme Court reversed the conviction
in May 2005. Arthur Andersen, LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005). See Eric L.
Talley, Cataclysmic Liability Risk among Big Four Auditors, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1641,
1663–64 (2006); Brickey, supra note 51, at 919–21 (providing a timeline of events in the
case).
54. Lawrence A. Cunningham, Too Big to Fail: Moral Hazard in Auditing and the
Need to Restructure the Industry Before It Unravels, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1698, 1701
(2006).
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awards following a scandal during the savings and loans crisis in
1991.55 KPMG, one of the remaining “Big 4,” avoided a noisy exit in
2005 when prosecutors decided to go after individual partners rather
than the firm in a criminal tax shelter scheme. 56 It appears that in all
cases the outcome was driven by the interplay between legal and
reputational consequences.
Gatekeeper theory provides an attractive analytical framework,
but it cannot explain the conduct of audit firms alone. First, in light of
the strong deterrent effect the reputational capital of a (former) Big 5
firm should exert in theory, one might expect the occasional minor
audit failure to happen, but not extremely costly scandals such as
Enron or WorldCom.57 Otherwise, the Big 4 would have lost numerous
clients due to major and minor scandals involving firms they were
auditing in recent years.58 Second, reputation may not always
disseminate through the market, and perceptions of impropriety in the
case of alleged malfeasance may differ.59 Third, reputation is at best a
“noisy signal.”60 The theory helps little in determining how strong
exactly the deterrent effect of a possible loss of reputation is, or how
strong it needs to be.
C. Quasi-rent Theory and Auditor Selection
1. The Auditor’s Incentive to Retain a Client
To analyze auditor independence, the accounting literature theory
sometimes uses the “quasi-rent model,” whose original form was
presented by Linda Elizabeth DeAngelo in 1981.61 “Quasi-rents”

55. See id. at 1700–01.
56. See id.
57. Assaf Hamdani, Gatekeeper Liability, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 53, 113 (2003); Kim,
supra note 34, at 424–25; see also Coffee, Understanding Enron, supra note 41, at 1405
(“experience over the 1990s suggests that professional gatekeepers do acquiesce in
managerial fraud”).
58. These collapses or financial scandals include BHS (PwC), Carrillion (KPMG),
Rolls-Royce (KMPG), and Quindell (KPMG) in the United Kingdom, Abengoa (Deloitte)
and Bankia (Deloitte) in Spain, the National Australian Bank (EY) in Australia, Satyam
(PwC) and Infrastructure Leasing and Financial Services (Deloitte and KPMG) in India,
Toshiba (EY) in Japan, Petrobras (PwC) in Brazil, and Xerox (KPMG) and Kmart (PwC)
in the United States. Other incidents should have also affected the reputation of audit
firms such as, see, e.g., the illicit use of PCAOB data and cheating on training exams that
led KPMG to a $50 million penalty. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, KPMG
Paying $50 Million Penalty for Illicit Use of PCAOB Data and Cheating on Training
Exams (June 17, 2019) (on file with U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n).
59. Tuch, supra note 12, at 1614.
60. Kraakman, Gatekeepers, supra note 35, at 97.
61. See Linda Elizabeth DeAngelo, Auditor Size and Quality, 3 J. ACCT. & ECON.
183 (1981) [hereinafter DeAngelo, Auditor Size]; DeAngelo, Auditor Independence, supra
note 24; see also DeFond & Zhang, supra note 47, at 311 (surveying the literature on
quasi-rents).
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represent the present value for an auditor to be rehired in future years
after an initial audit engagement.62 An incumbent auditor enjoys an
advantage over competing audit firms because an audit requires a
start-up cost.63 Members of the audit team have to familiarize
themselves with the company’s accounting procedures and check the
initial figures in the balance sheet, while in future years they can rely
on this client-specific experience and knowledge.64 Since other auditors
have not made these start-up expenses, the auditor and auditee are in
a bilateral monopoly that is difficult to break. 65
The audited firm will prefer to retain the current auditor because
of transaction costs (such as running a search) resulting from a switch,
and because the incumbent auditor can offer a lower price than
competitors.66 To be hired for the first time, auditors charge a “lowball”
price in the first year, but their competitive advantage allows them to
keep potential competitors at bay while charging a price above the
annual cost in future years. 67 Because of competition, auditors do not
extract economic rents from the audited client, but only “quasi-rents”
that compensate them for the lowball in the first year. 68 This pricing
structure is not necessarily an abuse by the auditing industry, but
rather a consequence of the declining marginal cost of follow-up audits.
2. Dangers to Auditor Independence and the Selection of the Auditor
Regulators have sometimes seen “low-balling” as
auditor independence,69 and quasi-rent theory seems to
independence is impossible to achieve. The auditor’s
ability to extract quasi-rents should create incentives to

a danger to
suggest that
monopolistic
hang on to a

62. DeAngelo, Auditor Independence, supra note 24, at 119–121.
63. Id. at 118.
64. Benito Arruñada & Cándido Paz-Ares, Mandatory Rotation of Company
Auditors: A Critical Examination, 17 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 31, 32–33 (1997).
65. DeAngelo, Auditor Size, supra note 61, at 188.
66. DeAngelo, Auditor Independence, supra note 24, at 119–21; DeAngelo,
Auditor Size, supra note 61, at 188.
67. DeAngelo, Auditor Independence, supra note 24, at 119. Competitors seeking
to displace an incumbent auditor would again have to make a lowball bid, which would
then put them into a similar situation.
68. See, e.g., Benito Arruñada, The Provision of Non-Audit Services by Auditors:
Let the Market Evolve and Decide, 19 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 513, 516 (1999); DeAngelo,
Auditor Independence, supra note 24, at 120. For a quantitative discussion of the issue
of competing bids, see Robert P. Magee & Mei-Chiun Tseng, Audit Pricing and
Independence, 65 ACCT. REV. 315, 318–20 (1990).
69. DeAngelo, Auditor Independence, supra note 24, at 113. Most recently, lowballing has been criticized by the SEC in the release amending auditor independence
rules. See Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence Requirements, Exchange
Act Release No. 33-7919 § 3(C)(2)(a)(i) (Feb. 5, 2001); Coffee, Acquiescent Gatekeeper,
supra note 42, at 28–29; DeAngelo, Auditor Independence, supra note 24, at 114–15; see
also Fischel, supra note 17, at 1053.
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client to extend this economic advantage.70 Being seen as insufficiently
cooperative from the client’s perspective could put an auditor at risk
for not being reappointed in the following year. 71 Upon closer
inspection, whether this concern holds water depends largely on the
appointment process.
First, many jurisdictions provide for mandatory disclosure in the
event of the removal of an auditor. In the United States, issuers must
disclose when an auditor resigns, declines to stand for reelection, or is
dismissed.72 The firm must disclose whether the accountant resigned,
declined to stand for reelection, or was dismissed, and whether the
accountant had issued an adverse opinion or qualified audit opinion. 73
The disclosures also must describe disagreements with the auditor. 74
Firing a recalcitrant auditor thus becomes a “high visibility sanction,”
which should deter managers from using it as a threat to bring the
auditor in line with their opinion.75
The EU Audit Directive is similar in this respect but seems to rely
on regulation rather than disclosure. Member states must “ensure that
statutory auditors or audit firms may be dismissed only where there
are proper grounds” (which do not include mere disagreements about
accounting treatments or audit procedures).76 Moreover, the audited
firm must inform the regulator responsible for supervising auditors of
a resignation or dismissal and must provide an explanation. 77
However, given that EU law does not generally require disclosure, such
a removal may go under the radar of the market. Moreover, it does not
address the question of non-reappointment (i.e., what happens when
an audit firm is not invited back after the completion of an audit).
Second, a key question is who decides about the appointment and
removal of the auditor. For example, in the United States the audit
committee—which is itself subject to independence requirements—is
also responsible for the auditor’s selection, which could suggest that
the committee is likewise in charge of replacing the auditor. 78
Similarly, the EU Audit Directive requires a proposal by the audit
committee for the selection of the auditor. 79 However, reliance on the

70. Fischel, supra note 17, at 1053.
71. DeAngelo, Auditor Size, supra note 61, at 190.
72. Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.304(a)(1) (1998).
73. § 229.304(a)(1)(i)–(ii).
74. § 229.304(a)(1)(iv).
75. Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management and Control of the
Modern Business Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, 69 U. CHI. L. REV 1233, 1237
(2002).
76. EU Audit Directive, supra notes 7 and 9, art. 38(1).
77. Id. at art. 38(2).
78. See Neil H. Aronson, Preventing Future Enrons: Implementing the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 127, 141 (2002).
79. EU Audit Directive, supra notes 7 and 9, art. 41(3) (applying only to “public
interest entities,” i.e. publicly traded firm and some others).
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audit committee raises a number of other questions, such as whether
the committee itself is sufficiently independent.
The involvement of shareholders in the selection process might
provide an additional check. Unlike US law, 80 the EU Audit Directive
requires a shareholder vote81 and envisions an enhancement of
independence through selection by shareholders. 82 The same ideas
echo in the theoretical literature. Some models integrate the quasi-rent
approach into the agency environment, with a principal appointing an
auditor to monitor an agent-manager.83 With the auditor having an
incentive to retain the client because of the quasi-rent, the principal
can then discipline the auditor by threatening him with removal. 84
Low-balling thus creates a bond set aside by the auditor when he defers
part of the first period’s audit fee to future periods. 85 In the case of
collusion, the auditor is not only subject to liability but also loses the
bond.86 The larger the bond, the stronger the auditor’s incentives will
be to maintain a high degree of audit quality and independence.87
In practice, it is rarely shareholders who actively select the
auditor. Even under the EU Directive, shareholders at best ratify a
selection made in practice by management or an audit committee that
may not be truly capable of independent judgment itself. 88 The
requirement of a shareholder vote may in fact do more harm than good:
in most European countries (like in most countries around the world),
publicly traded companies are usually dominated by controlling
shareholders or coalitions of large key shareholders on whose support

80. See, e.g., Lauren M. Cunningham, Auditor Ratification: Can’t Get No
(Dis)Satisfaction, 31 ACCT. HORIZONS 159 (2017) (“More than 90 percent of Russell 3000
companies voluntarily ask shareholders to ratify the company’s choice of auditor . . . as
a matter of ‘good corporate governance.’”).
81. EU Audit Directive, supra notes 7 and 9, at art. 37(1).
82. See id. at pmbl. recital 22 (discussing the selection of the auditor by
shareholders in the context of independence); id. at art. 37(2) (permitting alternative
auditor selection systems instead of appointment by shareholders only if they are
designed to ensure the auditor’s independence); see also Anand & Moloney, supra note
29, at 287–91 (suggesting that the presence of blockholders in Europe militates in favor
of a shareholder-centric strategy in audit oversight).
83. See generally Chi-Wen Jevons Lee & Zhaoyang Gu, Low Balling, Legal
Liability and Auditor Independence, 73 ACCT. REV. 533 (1998).
84. Id. at 535.
85. Id. at 545.
86. Id. at 535, 545.
87. Id. at 539–40, 545.
88. In particular, in the context of interested party transactions, the Delaware
courts are typically suspicious of supposedly disinterested directors’ ability to provide an
independent business judgment in the presence of controlling shareholders. See, e.g., In
re Pure Res., Inc., S'holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 436 (Del. Ch. 2002) (analogizing the
controlling shareholder to an “800-pound gorilla whose urgent hunger for the rest of the
bananas is likely to frighten less powerful primates like putatively independent directors
who might well have been hand-picked by the gorilla”); see generally Lucian A. Bebchuk
& Assaf Hamdani, Independent Directors and Controlling Shareholders, 165 U. PA. L.
REV. 1271, 1286–90 (2017).
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management depends.89 Europe’s most widely publicized accounting
scandal involving audit failure, Parmalat, involved the diversion of
assets to its controlling shareholders, mainly at the expense of
creditors.90 A truly independent auditor would also need to be
independent from dominant shareholder groups.91 It is therefore
inconceivable that the shareholder vote would have beneficial effect for
auditor independence.
D. Gatekeeper Reputation and the Market Impact of Quasi-Rents
At first glance, the gatekeeper and quasi-rent models seem to have
little in common. The former emphasizes the auditor’s reputational
incentive to remain independent, whereas the latter shows how the
cost structure of an auditor–client relationship puts independence at
risk. It is, however, quite easily possible to reconcile the two models by
analyzing an audit firm across multiple clients. If it draws quasi-rents
from each engagement, then an accounting scandal puts quasi-rents
from multiple auditor client relationships at risk. 92 If, for example an
auditor has n clients, then her total quasi-rent would sum up to 𝑄 =
∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝑞𝑖 , where 𝑞𝑖 is the quasi-rent at firm i. If management at firm x
puts pressure on the auditor to approve a problematic accounting
choice, she would risk losing the quasi-rent amounting to 𝑞𝑥 . However,
if a fully fledged accounting scandal erupts with probability p, she risks

89. Except for the United States, the United Kingdom and, to a lesser extent,
Japan and Australia, most countries around the world often have companies with
controlling shareholders. See Rafael La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership Around the
World, 54 J. FIN. 471 (1999); Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON.
1113 (1998); Gur Aminadav & Elias Papaioannou, Corporate Control Around the World,
75 J. FINANCE (forthcoming June 2020) (manuscript at 1) (on file with authors).
Moreover, it should be noted that the number of companies going public with dual-class
shares has increased in the past years. See Robert J. Jackson Jr., Comm’r, U.S. Sec. &
Exch. Comm’n, Address at University of California Berkeley Law, Perpetual Dual-Class
Stock: The Case Against Corporate Royalty (Feb. 15, 2018). Therefore, the rise of dualclass firms has generated more companies with controlling shareholders in the United
States. For an analysis of the corporate ownership structure prevailing in Australian
and Japanese companies, see STILPOR NESTOR & JOHN K. THOMPSON, CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE PATTERNS IN OECD ECONOMIES: IS CONVERGENCE UNDERWAY? (2006);
Jungwook Shim & Toru Yoshikawa, The Evolution of Ownership Structure in Japanese
Firms (1962–2012), in JAPANESE MANAGEMENT IN EVOLUTION: NEW DIRECTIONS,
BREAKS, AND EMERGING PRACTICES 21, 21–46 (Tsutomu Nakano ed., 2017); Alan J.
Dignam & Michael Galanis, Australia Inside-Out: The Corporate Governance System of
the Australian Listed Market, 28 MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 1 (2004); Julian R. Franks et
al., The Ownership of Japanese Corporations in the 20th Century (ECGI Fin., Working
Paper No. 410, 2014), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2397142 [https://perma.cc/EDH7-34NQ]
(Feb. 20, 2020).
90. Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure, supra note 34, at 332–33; Coffee, Corporate
Scandals, supra note 6, at 207–08 (contrasting the role of auditors in dispersed and
concentrated ownership regimes).
91. See Coffee, Corporate Scandals, supra note 6, at 208.
92. See, e.g., Arruñada & Paz-Ares, supra note 64, at 49; Arruñada, supra note
68, at 520.
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losing all the other quasi-rents. In other words, a rational auditor
would accede to the client’s demands if 𝑞𝑥 > 𝑝 ∙ ∑𝑛𝑖=1,𝑖≠𝑥 𝑞𝑖 (i.e., when the
benefit from client x exceeds the (probabilistic) loss of the benefit of all
of the other clients in the event of a scandal).
Consequently, an auditor’s quasi-rents with other clients (i.e., his
position in the market overall) constitutes the reputational bond that
should secure her independence.93 This has a number of consequences.
First, whether an auditor has incentives to remain independent
depends on how important the client in question is to her. An auditor
with a one-client practice that provides all of her income is unlikely to
be in the economic position to act independently.94 Empirical findings
show that larger offices of audit firms tend to provide higher audit
quality.95 By contrast, an auditor with a large market share and
diversified client base should in theory have a strong incentive to act
independently with respect to each individual client.96 Moreover, if
gatekeepers are under strong pressure to keep their price close to cost,
they may have incentives to shirk on quality. 97 This is not to say that
an oligopolistic market structure is necessarily optimal. On the one
hand, market concentration may be in part a function of the complexity
of accounting standards. Larger accounting firms may be better able to
train staff and spread the cost of keeping up with the requirements set
by the applicable GAAP across many clients.98 On the other hand,
market concentration may enable auditors to increase fees. 99 It may
also have the impact of reducing competition on audit quality. 100
Consequently, market structure likely entails a tradeoff: If audit firms
are too small, there is no deterrent reputational sanction, and they may
not be able to use economics of scale. If audit firms are too big, audit
quality may suffer from lack of competition. 101

93.
94.
95.

Arruñada & Paz-Ares, supra note 64, at 49.
See, e.g., Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure, supra note 34, at 322.
See Jong-Hag Choi et al., Audit Office Size, Audit Quality, and Audit Pricing,
29 AUDITING: J. PRAC. & THEORY 73 (2010); Jere R. Francis et al., Office Size of Big 4
Auditors and Client Restatements, 30 CONT. ACCT. RES. 1626 (2013).
96. Arruñada, supra note 68, at 520; Gadinis & Mangels, supra note 27, at 815;
Kim, supra note 34, at 431; see also Choi, supra note 20, at 942–43, 959–60; Fischel,
supra note 17, at 1053.
97. Choi, supra note 20, at 941–42.
98. Louis-Philippe Sirois et al., Auditor Size and Audit Quality Revisited: The
Importance of Audit Technology, 22 COMPTABILITÉ – CONTRÔLE – AUDIT 111, 125 (2016)
(creating a model where fixed costs are more easily sustainable in a larger audit market
because of economies of scale).
99. Choi, supra note 20, at 943–45. Choi’s model (which applies to gatekeepers in
general) suggests that this will lead some producers not to attempt to produce highquality products. However, this assumes that they can avoid certification cost to a
gatekeeper and selling an uncertified low-quality product, which is not possible in the
audit market. For a more detailed discussion of the effects of audit market concentration,
see infra Section IV.A.
100. Coffee, Understanding Enron, supra note 41, at 1414–15.
101. COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS, supra note 6, at 318.
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Second, if regulatory intervention can increase the probability of
detection (p), auditors will have stronger incentives to uncover
misrepresentations. Professor John Coffee has suggested that a
decreased likelihood of securities litigation against auditors and other
gatekeepers during the 1990s was one of the factors that led to a
deterioration of audit quality and an increased number of restatements
of earnings; changes in the case law and the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 are likely reasons according to Coffee. 102
While liability as such may not add much to reputation in terms of the
deterrent effect on auditors, a lawsuit and the ensuing negative
publicity could trigger a reputational sanction. However, if the
probability of detection of gatekeeper failure is quite low, as some have
argued,103 theory would dictate that additional sanctions are necessary
for deterrence. With the collapse of the audit firm as the potential
sanction, it is virtually impossible to implement additional
sanctions.104
Third, an auditor’s independence could be compromised if she
draws additional benefits from an auditor–client relationship. A
client’s management might be able to add to the amount of the quasirent 𝑞𝑥 by sweetening the deal with contracts for additional nonaudit
services (NAS). This could compromise the auditor’s independence. 105
However, if all of the other clients do the same in the same proportion,
then in theory the relative weights in the equation showing the
auditor’s incentives will be unchanged, and the auditor will be just as
independent as before.106 If one client consumes a disproportionate
amount of NAS, this may compromise the auditor’s independence.107 A
key question is how strongly dependent the auditor is on a specific
client.
Fourth, and most importantly, this analysis highlights the
necessity to determine who the functional gatekeeper is. Coffee, in his
analysis of the Enron scandal, suggests that Arthur Anderson’s
Houston office was strongly dependent on its biggest client, Enron, to
an extent that it could be described as a one-client practice.108 Sure,
Arthur Anderson had considerable reputational capital at stake
worldwide and, therefore, should have had strong reputational
incentives. However, Anderson’s staff in Houston most likely did not

102. Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure, supra note 34, at 311–15, 318–21; Coffee,
Understanding Enron, supra note 41, at 1409; see also Gadinis & Mangels, supra note
27, at 814 (noting the low probability of detection).
103. Gadinis & Mangels, supra note 27, at 817.
104. Id. at 818.
105. See, e.g., Coffee, Understanding Enron, supra note 41, at 1411.
106. Arruñada, supra note 68, at 520.
107. See id. at 520–22 (suggesting that the objective of regulating NAS should be
client diversification).
108. Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure, supra note 34, at 322; see also Coffee,
Understanding Enron, supra note 41, at 1415–16; Kim, supra note 34, at 431.
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internalize this full incentive before the scandal. The advantage of
“cooperating” with Enron’s management may have outweighed the risk
of reputational loss from an ex ante perspective. Hence, the key
problem was an internal agency problem within the accounting firm.
Individual auditors making key decisions do not have incentives that
would be optimal from the perspective of the audit firm as a whole.
While individual partners enjoy the benefits associated with any
increase in the value and reputation of the audit firm, they do not
internalize all the costs of the audit firm’s failure. While Arthur
Andersen’s audit partners suffered financially from the firm’s demise,
they typically were able to transition to other positions and continue
their careers.109 Moreover, long-term relationships between audit firm
staff and managers and accountants in the audited company may
develop into collegial relations or even friendships, which makes them
less likely to resist problematic accounting treatments or even outright
illegal conduct.110 If individual professionals are under pressure to
grow specific client accounts, the advantages of acquiescing to client
wishes are thus borne in part by the individual professionals.111 By
contrast, the firm may continue to bear the reputational
disadvantages, the reputational intermediary strategy is bound to
fail.112
III. TRADITIONAL RESPONSES TO THE AUDITORS’ INDEPENDENCE
PUZZLE (AND WHY THEY ALL FAIL)
A. Introduction
Auditor independence has been promoted through a variety of
mechanisms. There are certain strategies commonly used across
jurisdictions. These strategies include supervision, disclosure
obligations, disqualification of auditors, fines, civil liability, and, in
cases involving fraud, even criminal sanctions. This Part provides a
comparative perspective on strategies that have been tried across

109. See Chris Gaetano, 15 Years After Enron, Arthur Andersen Brand Resurges,
NYS SOCIETY CPAS (May 2, 2017), https://www.nysscpa.org/news/publications/thetrusted-professional/article/15-years-after-enron-arthur-andersen-brand-resurges
[https://perma.cc/RMJ2-UT8U] (archived Feb. 20, 2020).
110. Gadinis & Mangels, supra note 27, at 816.
111. See, e.g., Tad Miller, Do We Need to Consider the Individual Auditor when
Discussing Auditor Independence?, 5 ACCT., AUD. & ACCOUNTABILITY J. 74, 77 (1992)
(discussing how individual auditors may see growing service fees from particular clients
as advantageous to their career).
112. See id. at 79–80 (modelling audit firm’s and partner’s different interest in a
client relationship); see also Colleen Honigsberg, The Case for Individual Audit Partner
Accountability, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1871 (2019) (analyzing the misalignment of incentives
between audit partner and audit firms and suggesting a system of “audit scorecards” to
address this issue).
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countries over the years. The following sections will discuss the
imposition of auditor rotation and bans of certain services.
B. Rotation Models
One of the most common tools to enhance auditor independence
has been auditor rotation, which is sometimes mandated by law or
regulation.113 Internal rotation takes place when the audit partner
leading the audit process changes after a number of years but the audit
firm remains the same.114 This type of rotation is justified on two
primary grounds. First, rotation seeks to address the internal
governance problem in audit firms.115 Second, they are also justified
due to the loss of trust potentially faced by public investors if they
observe that the same audit team who works on a daily basis with the
audited firm has not changed over time.116 After all, long-term
relationships may create familiarity, which may make the auditors lose
their objectivity.117 Therefore, this factor, along with the inherent
conflict of interests faced by auditors as a result of the fact of being
paid by the client, may make public investors more skeptical about the
impartiality of the auditor.
Thus, it should be in the interest of both companies and audit
firms to change the audit partner and part (if not all) of its team, even
if the replacement of the audit team generates new costs in terms of
knowledge and familiarity with the audited firm. However, the fact
that audit firms have not introduced it voluntarily suggests that either
they do not have incentives to do so, or that their internal governance

113. See, e.g., EU Audit Directive, supra notes 7 and 9, at art. 17 (requiring
rotation of audit firms after 10 years, and rotation of audit partners after 7 years in the
context of public-interest entities). While internal rotation has been imposed in most
countries around the world, including the United States, the European Union, China
and Singapore, external rotation has been implemented just in a few jurisdictions,
including the European Union and Brazil. Usually, the period of internal rotation is
between five to seven years, depending on the jurisdiction, while the period of external
rotation goes from five years (Brazil, United States) to ten years (European Union). See
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 775, § 203 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 7232) (amending § 10A of the Securities Act of 1934 to require audit partner
rotation after 5 years); Mara Cameran et al., The Audit Mandatory Rotation Rule: The
State of Art, 3 J. FIN. PERSP. (2015); Armour et al., Transactions with Creditors, supra
note 4, at 123.
114. See Cameran et al., supra note 113, at 2.
115. Some empirical studies actually suggest that changing audit partners may
create positive effects. See Henry Laurion et al., U.S. Audit Partner Rotations, 92 ACCT.
REV. 209 (2017) (identifying an increase in the number of restatement discoveries). For
an analysis of the internal governance problem existing within audit firms and how to
fix it, see infra Parts IV.2–3.
116. Cameran et al., supra note 113, at 26.
117. This “familiarity threat” is mentioned in section 100.10(d) of the IFAC Code
of Ethics. Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants, INT’L FED’N ACCOUNTANTS (2006),
https://www.ifac.org/system/files/publications/files/ifac-code-of-ethics-for.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AD2A-CUHV] (archived Feb. 20, 2020).
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is not geared toward maximizing the joint interest of the firm.118 While
audit firms may want to preserve quasi-rents across all audit clients,
individual partners might not fully internalize the possible risk for the
firm.119 After all, if the firm fails, or it loses part of its reputation, this
might not fully reflect on audit partners who may even transition to a
different firm. Arguably, internal rotation can bring the interests of
individual audit partners better in line because their potential
advantages from being captured by the audit client will be reduced to
a few years at most.120 Consequently, many countries have decided to
intervene by imposing internal rotation. 121
External rotation occurs when the entire audit firm changes. 122
This type of rotation seeks to address the inherent conflict of interests
between the audit firm and its client by limiting the period by which
the audit firm can interact with and get fees from the audited
company.123 From a policy perspective, if the imposition of internal
rotation can be challenged based on the private incentives held by
audited companies and audit firms, there are still more arguments
against the imposition of external rotation.124
First, changing the entire audit firm is more costly than internal
rotation.125 It will force the new auditor to spend even more hours to
become familiar with the client.126 In addition, it may require more
coordination efforts between the new and the previous auditor. 127
Therefore, since these costs will be charged to the client, the audited
company will likely respond with an increase in the price of its goods
and services. As a result, this measure may make firms and investors

118. See supra Part II.4; infra IV.2–3.
119. See supra Part II.4; infra IV.2–3.
120. See, e.g., Henry Laurion et al., supra note 115, at 210.
121. Internal rotation has been implemented in most jurisdictions around the
world, including the United States, the European Union, China, and Singapore.
Countries not imposing internal rotation include, for example, Brazil and South Korea.
See Cameran et al., supra note 113, at 5–8.
122. Id. at 2.
123. Id. at 9–11.
124. Id. at 113.
125. See, e.g., Arruñada & Paz-Ares, supra note 64, at 36 (estimating cost increases
between fifteen percent and twenty-five percent). For a review of the empirical literature
on mandatory rotation, see Soo Young Kwon et al., The Effect of Mandatory Audit Firm
Rotation on Audit Quality and Audit Fees: Empirical Evidence from the Korean Audit
Market, 33 AUDITING: J. PRAC. & THEORY 167 (2014); Yi Liang, Evaluating Market-Based
Corporate Governance Reform: Evidence from a Structural Analysis of Mandatory
Auditor
Rotation
(Temple
Univ.
Sch.
Bus.,
Working
Paper,
2015),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2686354 [https://perma.cc/VMT58FXZ] (archived Feb. 20, 2020); Cameran et al., supra note 113.
126. Cameran et al., supra note 113, at 11–12.
127. To alleviate this concern, art. 23(3) of the EU Audit Directive provides that
an auditor or audit firm that has been replaced must provide the income auditor “with
access to all relevant information concerning the audited entity.” EU Audit Directive,
supra notes 7 and 9.
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worse off.128 Second, the imposition of external rotation may make it
easier for the management to seek the most accommodating auditor
more frequently.129 Third, from a theoretical perspective, it is not clear
that a rotation requirement will reduce the auditor’s dependence on
specific clients.130 In the model outlined in subpart IIC, a reduction of
the auditor’s quasi-rents in a specific client because of external rotation
is paralleled by the reduction of quasi-rents with all other clients
subject to the same requirement.131 Thus, if an auditor has a
diversified client base, rotation will not have an effect on the auditor’s
economic incentives set by quasi-rents ceteris paribus.132 Fourth, if the
nonrenewal of an auditor is a valuable signal to the market, 133 then
imposing mandatory rotation will dilute this signal potentially
provided by a renewal or dismissal of auditors. Finally, if having an
auditor for a long period of time makes investors lose their trust, firms
should have incentives to change auditors even if it is not required. 134
For these reasons, it is not clear whether the imposition of external
rotation is a desirable measure. 135 That might explain why this rule
has not been adopted by many jurisdictions, although the EU now
requires it for publicly traded firms (and some others).136
C. Prohibition of Nonaudit Services
Audit firms usually provide a full range of professional nonaudit
services (NAS), including tax and consultancy work. The ability to
provide these services can generate several types of benefits. On the
level of the individual client, there are considerable economies of scope
between audit services and related NAS that create cost savings

128. See Josep Garcia-Blandon et al., On the Relationship between Audit Tenure
and Fees Paid to the Audit Firm and Audit Quality, 17 ACCT. IN EUR. 78 (2020) (finding
that audit firm tenure is positively associated with audit quality, while individual
auditor tenure is associated with a reduction in audit quality).
129. John C. Coffee, Jr., Auditing is too important to be left to the auditors!, COLUM.
LAW
SCH.
BLUE
SKY
BLOG
(Jan.
28,
2019),
http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2019/01/28/auditing-is-too-important-to-be-left-tothe-auditors/ [https://perma.cc/79U7-W46P] (archived Feb. 9, 2020) [hereinafter Coffee,
Auditing]. For a more detailed explanation of the criticism of the external mandatory
rotation based on this argument, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Why Do Auditors Fail? What
Might Work? What Won't?, (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst. Working Paper No. 436/2019,
2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3314338 [https://perma.cc/526G-RBSL] (archived Feb.
9, 2020) [hereinafter Coffee, Why].
130. See Arruñada & Paz-Ares, supra note 64.
131. Id.
132. See, e.g., id. at 49.
133. See supra notes 72–75 and accompanying text.
134. See supra Part II.C.
135. See Cameran et al., supra note 113.
136. See EU Audit Regulation, supra note 11, at art. 17(1). In the US, § 207 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 stipulated that the US General Accounting Office should
study the merits of external rotation, but ultimately rejected it. Pub. L. No. 107-24, 116
Stat. 745 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7232).
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(relative to the separate provision of such services by a different firm),
which can also be passed on to clients. 137 In addition, NAS may
increase the knowledge and expertise of auditors in many areas
potentially useful to conduct an audit. 138 On the market level, it can
increase the profitability and competitiveness of audit firms. Thus,
they will be in a better position to spend more resources on technology
and human capital that can ultimately increase the quality of the
auditor’s work.
However, while the possibility of providing a full range of
professional services can create several benefits, it may also create
problems. First, services provided to the auditor’s client may create
more economic dependency if the auditor’s client portfolio is not
diversified.139 To address this problem, regulators have often
responded by limiting the fees potentially charged to a single client. 140
For example, under EU law, fees received by an audit firm from a
single client for nonaudit services must not exceed 70 percent of audit
fees over a three-year period.141 If a firm receives more than 15 percent
of its total fees from a single client, this must be disclosed to the audit
committee in order to discuss measures to mitigate dangers to
independence.142
Second, providing certain services may create a problem of “selfreview.”143 In other words, sometimes auditors may provide
professional services (e.g., tax, valuations) that may affect the
company’s financial statements. Since the auditor’s primary role is
verifying a company’s financial statements and making sure that they
fairly present the audited firm’s financial position according to
generally accepted accounting principles, there will be a clear conflict
if the auditor has to review something their firm previously prepared
for the client.144 Obviously, preparing the client’s financial statement
would be the most obvious conflict. 145 However, there are more subtle
ones that may affect the company’s financial statements, including
valuations, tax services, and the implementation of a system of

137. Arruñada, supra note 68, at 513–14.
138. See, e.g., Mohinder Parkash & Carol F. Venable, Auditee Incentives for
Auditor Independence: The Case of Nonaudit Services, 66 ACCT. REV. 113 (1993)
(discussing knowledge spillovers); Dan A. Simunic, Auditing, Consulting, and Auditor
Independence, 22 J. ACCT. RES. 679, 681 (1984) (discussing knowledge spillovers).
139. See Arruñada & Paz-Ares, supra note 64.
140. See EU Audit Regulation, supra note 11, at art. 4(1).
141. See id. at art. 4(2).
142. See id. at art. 4(3).
143. See INDEP. STANDARDS BD., STAFF REPORT: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR
AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE 4 (2001).
144. See id.
145. For this reason, it is one of the most relevant types of NAS traditionally
prohibited. See EU Audit Regulation, supra note 11, at art. 5; Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 201, 116 Stat. 775 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7232).
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internal control.146 In jurisdictions with close book-tax conformity,147
tax services may create similar problems.148 Therefore, NAS services
may not only threaten independence by tightening the economic ties to
the client but also by the fact that the auditor has to review its own
work. Consequently, some legislatures have responded by restricting
the types of NAS potentially provided to audit clients.149
While the need to prohibit NAS from creating a self-review threat
should be self-evident, attempts to limit economic dependence on
clients often appear to miss the mark.150 Just as with quasi-rents from
the provision of audit services (above subpart IIC), a large firm with
hundreds of clients will not normally be dependent on nonaudit
services provided to a specific client. 151 Firms that provide audit
services to all clients will increase their quasi-rents overall and not be
more or less dependent on any one of them. 152 More importantly,
individual audit partners or teams may be dependent even if the entire
firm is not. Requiring the approval of nonaudit services by the audit
committee153 may be a step in the right direction if the committee looks
not only at the independence of the audit firm, but the specific partner.
Ultimately, the issue is one of the audit firm’s internal governance (see
below subpart V.C.).
Even more controversial is the complete prohibition of NAS by
licensed audited firms.154 This is a more extreme response that has not
been implemented in any major jurisdiction, likely because services
provided to other clients do not create a threat to independence of audit

146. See Simunic, supra note 138.
147. See, e.g., Martin Gelter & Zehra G. Kavame Eroglu, Whose Trojan Horse? The
Dynamics of Resistance against IFRS, 36 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 89, 145 (2014) (contrasting
strong book-tax conformity in France and Germany with the US); Wolfgang Schön, The
Odd Couple: A Common Future for Financial and Tax Accounting?, 58 TAX L. REV. 111,
115–122 (2005) (comparing the relatively close book-tax conformity with greater
differences between financial and tax accounting in the US and the UK).
148. See Christian Nowotny, Taxation, Accounting, and Transparency: The
Missing Trinity of Corporate Life, in TAX AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 101, 107–08
(Wolfgang Schön ed. 2008).
149. Note that unlike Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 201(g), EU Audit Regulation, art.
5(1)(a) prohibits most tax services. See EU Audit Regulation, supra note 11, at art. 5;
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 201(g).
150. See DeFond & Zhang, supra note 47, at 309 (describing the empirical results
on the impact of NAS on audit quality as inconclusive); Jere R. Francis, Are Auditors
Compromised by Nonaudit Services? Assessing the Evidence, 23 CONT. ACCT. RES. 747
(2006) (describing the empirical results on the impact of NAS on audit quality as
inconclusive).
151. See Arruñada, supra note 68.
152. See id. at 520.
153. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 201(h); Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R
§ 210.2.01(c)(7)(i)(A) (2020); see also EU Audit Directive, supra notes 7 and 9, at art.
39(6)(e).
154. See Walter Doralt et al., Auditor Independence at the Crossroads – Regulation
and Incentives, 13 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 89, 94 (2012) (discussing this proposal).
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clients.155 However, hiring an auditor for nonaudit services can be a
route for being hired for future audit work and the other way
around.156 Prohibiting auditors from conducting nonaudit services in
general would force firms to separate their audit business from their
consultancy business.157 As the provision of NAS can be beneficial for
the quality and competitiveness of the audit profession,158 this solution
would come at a heavy price.
The provision of NAS before an audit raises primarily a self-review
threat, given that NAS tend to be more profitable. 159 Consequently,
rules prohibiting specific types of NAS seem most appropriate. These
should apply in the abstract to previous years as long as the NAS still
have an effect on the audited financial statements. At present, US law,
which prohibits NAS only contemporaneously to the audit,160 is
underinclusive, while the EU Audit Regulation, which reaches back to
the prior fiscal year,161 is better tailored to this threat. To be on the
safer side, regulators could consider longer cooling-off periods.
NAS after the end of an audit engagement can affect economic
independence when the audit firm provides audit services with the
expectation of being hired in the future for consultancy work. 162
Temporal limitations to provide NAS to previous audit clients should
be long enough to undermine the value of any promise made by the
company or the auditor. This would reduce the value of any promise
for future hiring (considering that other circumstances may intervene,
such as the replacement of the client’s management or new controlling
shareholders). Prohibitions of several years after an audit would likely
eliminate problems.

155. See Doralt et al., supra note 154.
156. This argument has been made by the Labor Party in the United Kingdom to
advocate for breaking up the Big Four. See MPs urge break-up of Big Four accountancy
firms, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/b7c0d144-5487-11e9-91f9b6515a54c5b1 [https://perma.cc/T7Z2-5UKQ] (archived Feb. 9, 2020).
157. This proposal has actually been proposed by the Labor Party in the United
Kingdom. See id.
158. See supra notes 137–138 and accompanying text.
159. See generally STATUTORY AUDIT SERVICES MARKET STUDY, COMPETITION &
MKTS.
AUTH.
(Apr.
18,
2019),
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5d03667d40f0b609ad3158c3/audit_final_
report_02.pdf?_ga=2.264723404.2118062599.1566879225-1197864597.1566879225
[https://perma.cc/S2ME-XTND] (archived Feb. 9, 2020).
160. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 201(g), 116 Stat. 745
(codified at EU Audit Regulation, supra note 11, at art. 5; Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 201, 116 Stat. 775 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7232); Regulation S-X,
17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(c)(4) (2020).
161. See EU Audit Regulation, supra note 11, at art. 5(1)(b) (extending
prohibitions of certain NAS provided to public interest entities to the year preceding the
audit).
162. See Monika Causholli, Dennis J. Chambers & Jeff L. Payne, Future NonAudit Services Fee and Audit Quality, 31 CONT. ACCT. RES. 681 (2014) (finding that
subsequent opportunities to provide NAS are associated with lower audit quality).
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IV. RECENT PROPOSALS TO DEAL WITH THE AUDITORS’ INDEPENDENCE
PUZZLE
The regulatory responses implemented to address the auditors’
independence puzzle do not seem to successfully solve the conflict of
interest faced by auditors. For this reason, new proposals have been
suggested in the past years, including the possibility of breaking up big
audit firms, as well as increasing the power of public investors in the
nomination of auditors.163 As will be mentioned in subpart IVA, these
proposals can solve part of the problem. However, they still present
some flaws. As a result, Part V proposes a new model to deal with the
auditors’ independence puzzle in a more efficient manner.
A. Break-Up of Audit Firms
The United Kingdom, following a proposal submitted by the
Labour Party, has been recently discussing whether audit firms
(particularly the Big 4) should be broken up.164 Namely, it has been
argued that audit is often the route to have access to consultancy
services, and that the conflicts of interest between auditors and clients
undermine the quality of the work and ultimately the value of audit to
investors.165 Moreover, critics claim that since the audit industry is
mainly controlled by the Big 4, these firms, in their situation of factual
oligopoly, do not have incentives to provide top quality services. 166
Breaking up audit firms aims at several goals. First, by reducing the
size of the Big 4, the reform seeks to increase the quality of services
because of competition.167 Second, it intends to force auditors to
specialize on audit services.168 Finally, and perhaps more importantly,
by prohibiting audit firms from providing nonaudit services to existing
or nonexisting clients, this proposal would also reduce conflicts of
interest.169
This proposal faces a number of considerable objections. First,
auditing financial statements is a difficult task that requires a broad

163. See Coffee, Why, supra note 129.
164. Following a number of corporate collapses including the demise of Carillion
and BHS, the UK regulator has been seeking to address auditor independence.
Cognizant of a high level of concentration in the audit industry (the Big Four audit
ninety-seven percent of the FTSE 350), the regulator considered breaking up the Big
Four. While the Competition and Market Authority ultimately decided against this
measure, the Labour Party official endorses a break-up. See STATUTORY AUDIT SERVICES
MARKET STUDY, supra note 159; see also MPs urge break-up of Big Four accountancy
firms, supra note 156.
165. See STATUTORY AUDIT SERVICES MARKET STUDY, supra note 159, at 82–83,
86.
166. See id. at 102–04.
167. See id. at 76–77.
168. See id. at 123–25.
169. See id.
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set of skills, including expertise in accounting, statistics, business
management, and tax, among other areas. As discussed in subpart
IIIC, knowledge spillovers from NAS can increase their level of
expertise for their work as auditors.170 Second, since audit firms would
not be allowed to provide NAS, they will become less profitable. As a
result, they might reduce their investments in technology and human
capital, which could negatively affect audit quality over time. Third,
the diminished accounting firms might find it more difficult to draw a
talented workforce into the audit profession, given that NAS often
provide the most interesting opportunities for talented professionals.
Fourth, auditing large, often multinational, clients requires
international coordination, and typically clients prefer the same “Big
4” group as its auditor in all jurisdictions. 171
Fifth, as discussed above, concentration in the audit market may
be a consequence of economics of scale and scope in the market for
audit services that is hard to avoid.172 The complexity and everchanging nature of accounting standards likely makes it costly and
time-consuming to keep up. Large firms likely have an advantage over
smaller firms because they can spread investment in knowledge and
skills across many clients. Finally, if reputation and client
diversification set important incentives for audit firms to preserve
their independent position, as suggested by gatekeeper theory, then a
breakup of the industry into smaller firms could undercut the status of
audit firms as “reputational intermediaries.” 173 While in a large audit
firm the tug-a-war between the overall interest of the firm and the
individual interest of partners might put some breaks on the possible
capture of specific partners by clients, this will no longer be true in
small firms.174 Smaller firms might ultimately become quite dependent
on specific clients, especially when these are multinational
corporations with considerable bargaining power. 175 Therefore,
breaking up the audit industry could make economic independence
problems worse and distract from the key problem, namely an audit
firm’s internal agency cost.
B. Empowerment of Shareholders
In a recent article, Professor John Coffee advocated for a new
approach to auditor independence.176 First, he argued that the
regulator should grade auditors. 177 Second, public investors

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

See supra Part III.C.
See STATUTORY AUDIT SERVICES MARKET STUDY, supra note 159, at 152.
See id. at 92–93.
See supra Part II.D.
See, e.g., Arruñada, supra note 68, at 42–43.
See id.
See Coffee, Auditing, supra note 129.
See id.
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representing a certain percentage of the company’s equity (e.g., 10
percent) should be entitled to nominate a different auditor and place
its nominee before the shareholders for a vote at the annual meeting. 178
While institutional investors are usually described as passive
investors,179 they often vote on generic issues of corporate governance
that recur across their portfolios (e.g., board diversity, climate change,
etc.), in part because they can follow a common policy. 180 Therefore,
since, according to Coffee, the appointment of an auditor represents
such a generic issue, they would engage in the election of auditors. 181
In conjunction with institutional investors, Coffee also argues that
activist investors (such as hedge funds) and proxy advisors should also
have incentives to engage in the process of appointing auditors. 182 In
the case of activist investors, getting involved in this process may be
part of a larger strategy of presenting themselves as the shareholders’
champion and then seeking board representation. 183 Therefore, they
will be happy to play the role of instigators and bear the costs. 184 In
the case of proxy advisors, if the regulator grades the quality of an
auditor’s work, it will be easier (and safer) for them to recommend a
vote against these auditors.185 Therefore, they should also have
incentives to engage in the appointment of auditors.
Even though this proposal would increase the accountability of
auditors to public investors, it is unlikely to solve the auditors’
independence puzzle. First, unless this system is implemented in
conjunction with a long temporal prohibition to provide NAS to the
audit client, audit firms will still have incentives to favor the interest
of corporate insiders as a means to increase the likelihood of being
hired for consultancy services. Second, even if public investors have the
ability to nominate an auditor, controlling shareholders (in controlled
firms) and managers (in firms with dispersed ownership structure) still
have a great influence in the shareholders’ meeting. Auditors will
continue to have incentives to please insiders in order to secure its
appointment. Third, while large public investors, such as BlackRock,
Vanguard, and State Street, have incentives to police auditors in those
companies they invest in, they may not want to antagonize audit firms
they work with in another role. After all, they also need to be audited,

178. See id.
179. See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Index Funds and the Future
of Corporate Governance: Theory, Evidence and Policy (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst.
Working
Paper
No.
433/2018,
2019),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3282794
[https://perma.cc/94LX-4DB3] (archived Feb. 10, 2020).
180. See Coffee, Auditing, supra note 129.
181. At present, there is not even legal requirement for shareholders to vote on the
appointment of the auditors. However, most firms allow shareholders to ratify the
engagement. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
182. See Coffee, Auditing, supra note 129.
183. See id.
184. See id.
185. See id.
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typically by one of the Big 4. Fourth, Coffee argues that selecting the
auditor represents a generic corporate governance issue because,
across their portfolios, institutional investors want objective
information and could follow a common policy of voting against a poorly
graded auditor.186 However, even though having accurate information
is indeed a general matter, the desirability of an auditor may differ
across firms. Even among the Big 4, some audit firms may have more
expertise in certain sectors. This argument would be even more
compelling if the audit industry were more competitive. Therefore,
selecting the most appropriate auditor may require some investigation
costs that a passive investor may not want to bear. Finally, and
perhaps more importantly, in companies with controlling
shareholders, which are most companies around the world, 187
facilitating the nomination of auditors for minority investors would not
make a significant difference. As the controller will still dominate the
appointment of auditors through the shareholder meeting, the auditor
will have incentives to treat corporate insiders (and particularly the
controller) favorably—or at least public investors can reasonably think
so.188
V. GOING FORWARD: NEW PROPOSALS FOR AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE
Regulators seeking to solve the auditor independence puzzle face
two primary challenges. On the one hand, they need to provide a
solution to the inherent conflict of interest existing between audit firms
and their clients.189 On the other hand, this solution should not
undermine the quality of the audit services.190 The following subparts
develop a proposal to solve the auditors’ independence puzzle. These
reforms will focus on three primary areas: (i) a reform of the system for
the appointment of auditors in the context of controlled firms; (ii) a
reform of the composition and operation of the audit committee; and
(iii) a final reform increasing transparency in the internal governance
of audit firms and audit partners’ compensation.

186. See id.
187. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
188. In fact, some of the most significant accounting scandals involved controlled
firms. In some cases (e.g., Parmalat, Madoff), these companies were controlled by a
family or founder. In others (e.g., Enron), the firm was controlled by the managers.
189. This challenge has guided many audit reforms, including those implemented
after Enron, or those recently suggested in the United Kingdom consisting of break-up
audit firms. For an analysis of audit reforms, see Coffee, Why, supra note 129.
190. See Arruñada & Paz-Ares, supra note 64, at 56–58; Coffee, Why, supra note
129.
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A. Majority-of-the-Minority Approval in Controlled Firms
The empowerment of shareholders makes sense in companies
with a dispersed ownership structure where there is a high risk of
managerial agency problems. Therefore, it fails in companies with
controlling shareholders. In these companies, the insiders to be
watched not only include managers but also the controlling
shareholder, or coalitions of large shareholders that jointly control the
company. In such companies, there is no possibility that a shareholder
vote on the auditor will improve his independence. This is true both
under US law, where shareholders ratify the appointment as a matter
of practice, and under the EU Audit Directive, which requires an
appointment of the auditor by shareholders.191 In practice, the auditor
will be elected in practice by the controller.
This problem is very familiar in the context of independent
directors.192 Indeed, independent directors are often not truly
independent in controlled firms due to the influence of the controlling
shareholder in their appointment and removal.193 For this reason,
scholars and policymakers have brought forward several proposals,
some of which have been implemented internationally. 194
Other than boards, which combine a number of functions, namely
both monitoring and the implementation of the interests of
shareholders (but also groups of shareholders) within corporate
decision-making, auditors exclusively have a monitoring function. It is
therefore not self-evident that the appointment of auditors should be
left to the majority of shareholders. As a matter of fact, controlling
shareholders will not need an auditor to monitor management, but will
have more direct channels available if they need additional
information about the firm. Frequently, they are strongly represented
on boards, or their representatives take leading management functions
(e.g., in family firms). Accounting scandals in firms with controlling
shareholders typically involve self-dealing transactions with them that
a more independent auditor might have uncovered.195

191. See supra notes 80–81 and accompanying text.
192. See, e.g., Maria Gutierrez & Maribel Saez, Deconstructing Independent
Directors, 13 J. CORP. L. STUD. 63 (2013); Wolf-Georg Ringe, Independent Directors: After
the Crisis, 14 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 401 (2013); Umakanth Varottil, Evolution and
Effectiveness of Independent Directors in Indian Corporate Governance, 6 HASTINGS BUS.
L.J. 281 (2010); John Armour et al., Shareholder Protection and Stock Market
Development: An Empirical Test of the Legal Origins Hypothesis 40 (Eur. Corp.
Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 108, 2008); Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 88.
193. See Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 88.
194. For a summary of these proposals, see Aurelio Gurrea-Martínez, Towards a
credible system of independent directors in controlled firms (Ibero-American Inst. for L.
& Fin., Working Paper Series 1/2019, 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3380868
[https://perma.cc/5UBZ-LRQL] (archived Feb. 10, 2020); Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra
note 88.
195. See Coffee, supra note 6, at 207–08.
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In such firms, policymakers need to see auditors as agents of
public investors, other stakeholders, and users of financial statements.
While it is hardly practicable to include all of these groups in the
election or ratification process for the auditor, it seems straightforward
to replicate some of the proposals brought forward in the context of
independent directors.
This does not mean that rules for the appointment of auditors
need to vary across firms. Controlling shareholders (if there are any)
should merely be required to abstain from voting. Admittedly, this
proposal does not change the appointment process in dispersed
ownership firms, where institutional investor activism would have to
play a major role in making sure that the auditors are not too close to
the management. The proposal suggested in this Article merely seeks
to create a similar situation in controlled firms by excluding the key
group to be monitored from the election. Effectively, auditors should
thus be elected by a majority of the minority investors. The audit
committee and/or board should then be required to negotiate the audit
engagement agreement in good faith.
Some questions might be raised regarding when exactly a
shareholder should be prohibiting from voting. First, how to delineate
controlling shareholders for the purpose of majority-of-the-minority
(MOM) approval? Relying exclusively on de facto control and an
assessment by a court would create an increased risk of an ex post
invalidity of the appointment. Laws therefore often use more formal
control definitions for various purposes. 196 To prevent an easy
circumvention of the definition, it seems advisable to use a relatively
low threshold and to define as controlling shareholders those with the
ability to exercise or control the exercise of 30 percent or more of the
votes to be cast, and those able to appoint or remove directors holding
a majority of voting rights at board meetings. 197

196. For example, in the context of takeovers (especially in countries with a
mandatory bid rule), the concept of control is usually defined. In some countries, a
situation of control exists, unless it is shown otherwise, whenever a shareholder has a
certain percentage of the company´s voting rights. Other countries follow a more
functional definition of control, based on the idea of the facto control. For an analysis of
this discussion, see Umakanth Varottil, Comparative Takeover Regulation and the
Concept of 'Control', 2015 SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 208, 208–31. Likewise, in the context of
groups of companies, particularly when it comes to the imposition of consolidating
financial statements, the concept of control is often defined by the legislation too. For
example, in the EU Member States, a parent company is required to prepare
consolidated financial statements (unless an exemption applies) whenever it has control
over other companies. For that purpose, Audit Directive art. 22(1) establishes certain
presumptions of control, including when the company holds the majority of another
company’s voting rights, or when it has the ability to appoint the majority of the board
in another company. See EU Audit Directive , supra notes 7 and 9.
197. See, e.g., FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY, FEEDBACK ON CP12/25:
ENHANCING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE LISTING REGIME AND FURTHER CONSULTATION
Annex A 2–4 (2013), https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/consultation/cp13-15.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7448-UQT5] (archived Feb. 10, 2020).
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Second, what if there is not a single controller, but multiple large
shareholders that dominate the firm in combination? In this case, and
similarly to what happens in the context of takeover regulation, 198 the
law should clarify that acting in concert to satisfy the criteria for
control also excludes shareholders from voting.
Finally, it should be kept in mind that minority shareholders,
under some circumstances, may be reluctant to oppose the
appointment of auditors selected by the majority. After all, they might
also need to be audited, and the existence of a factual oligopoly in the
audit industry may force them to choose the same auditors that they
are supposed to police. Ideally, minority investors should be required
to disclose conflicts of interest and, if it is severe enough, be prohibited
from voting as well (for example, when a minimum percentage of the
audit firm’s revenues come from the minority investors).
While the imposition of a MOM approval for the appointment of
auditor is not a perfect solution, it significantly improves the current
regime since it minimizes the risk associated with letting the auditors
be selected by the group of people that they are supposed to monitor.
In light of market failures in the audit industry and the insiders’ ability
to opportunistically select a compliant auditor, this solution should be
adopted as a mandatory rule.
B. Enhancing the Role and Composition of the Audit Committee
Most countries around the world require public companies to have
an audit committee to oversee the company’s financial reporting and
audit policies.199 This committee plays a significant role in the
appointment, removal, and monitoring of the company’s auditor. 200 For
this reason, most of its members must be independent directors. 201
Likewise, as this committee should have the technical knowledge
required to oversee auditors and financial reporting, some jurisdictions

198. In the EU, for example, see Council Directive 2004/25, art. 5, 2004 O.J. (L 142)
17 (EC) (regarding Takeover Bids). In other jurisdictions, see Varottil, supra note 196.
199. See OECD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FACTBOOK, ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV. 121–22 (2019), www.oecd.org/corporate/corporate-governancefactbook.htm [https://perma.cc/7EM8-HQP3] (archived Feb. 10, 2020) [hereinafter
OECD] (reporting that ninety-two percent of jurisdictions now require listed companies
to establish an independent audit committee, while the remaining jurisdictions
recommend it in corporate governance codes).
200. For a general overview of the role of the audit committee, see IOSCO REPORT
ON GOOD PRACTICES FOR AUDIT COMMITTEE AND SUPPORTING AUDIT QUALITY, INT’L ORG.
OF
SEC.
COMM’NS
(Jan.
2019),
https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD618.pdf
[https://perma.cc/66BLR24P] (archived Feb. 10, 2020). In the US, see Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(c)(7)
(2020) (requiring the approval of the auditor’s engagement as well as the approval of the
amount of NAS by the audit committee).
201. See OECD, supra note 199.
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require the members of the audit committee (or some of them) to have
expertise in accounting, audit, and/or financial matters.202
Unfortunately, audit committees often do not seem to be doing
their job in an effective manner, since the empirical evidence suggests
that the audit market penalizes auditors for providing investors with
value-relevant information that is critical of management. 203
Therefore, companies—with the approval of the audit committee —
may prefer to hire less strict auditors.204 As a result, any future reform
seeking to solve the auditors’ independence puzzle should put more
emphasis on the audit committee.
First, the audit committee should be formed by a majority of
members with expertise in accounting, auditing, and finance. 205
Otherwise, they might not be able to identify weaknesses in the
company’s internal control as well as the accounting and audit
practices. Second, this committee should be formed by people willing
and able to decide what is best for public investors, regardless of the
interest of the corporate insiders. Unfortunately, this is a more severe
problem. Many individuals with expertise in accounting may lack
independence because of close connections with the audit industry.
Moreover, the appointment of independent directors (including those
included in the audit committee) is usually influenced by corporate

202. For example, in the United States, issuers must disclose whether at least one
“financial expert” serves on the audit committee. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub.
L. No. 107-204, § 407, 116 Stat. 745 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7265). In addition, the NYSE
requires that at least one member must have “accounting or related financial
management expertise.” See NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.07(a),
https://nyseguide.srorules.com/listed-company-manual/document?treeNodeId=csh-dafilter!WKUS-TAL-DOCS-PHC-%7B0588BF4A-D3B5-4B91-94EA-BE9F17057DF0%7D-WKUS_TAL_5667%23teid-75 (last visited Feb. 10, 2020) [https://perma.cc/P6Q2-J4QV]
(archived Feb. 10, 2020). Likewise, NASDAQ listing standards require at least one audit
committee member to be “financially sophisticated,” and require all audit committee
members to be able to read and understand financial statements. See NASDAQ EQUITY
RULES, IM-5605-3, IM-5605-4. Under EU law “at least one member of the audit
committee shall have competence in accounting and/or auditing.” EU Audit Directive,
supra notes 7 and 9, at art. 39(1).
203. See Elizabeth N. Cowle & Stephen P. Rowe, Don’t Make Me Look Bad: How
the Audit Market Penalizes Auditors for Doing Their Job 17 (Working Paper, 2019),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3228321 [https://perma.cc/XNN9-D4LK] (archived Feb. 10,
2020) (tracking the issuance of internal control material weaknesses (ICMWs) and
finding that the issuance of a single ICMW is associated with a 2.5 percent lower growth
in the number of clients and an eight percent decline in year-over-year revenue for that
office).
204. See id. at 26–27 (blaming the audit committee for the punishment, in terms
of fewer appointments and lower fees, of those auditors detecting more internal
weaknesses); see also STATUTORY AUDIT SERVICES MARKET STUDY, supra note 159 (audit
industry report recommending increased accountability of audit committees).
205. In most countries, members with financial expertise represent only a minority
on the committee. Moreover, expertise on corporate governance is not required. For
example, Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 407 requires issuers to disclose whether one committee
member qualifies as a “financial expert” or not. See also Regulation S-K, Item 407, 17
C.F.R. § 229.407(d)(5) (2020).

820

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 53:787

insiders.206 Therefore, for the audit committee to work effectively, and
for the auditors to create confidence in public investors, regulators
need to first enhance the system of approval and removal of
independent directors.207 In the context of firms with dispersed
ownership structures, where the CEO plays an important role in the
appointment and removal of independent directors, the system can be
improved by increasing the voice and power of shareholders, for
example, by enhancing the system of proxy voting and the role of proxy
advisors.208 By contrast, in companies with controlling shareholders,
the appointment and removal of independent directors is mainly
decided by the controller.209 In these companies, a credible system of
independent directors should require the vote by both the
shareholders’ meeting and a majority of the minority for the
appointment and removal of independent directors, as well as the
mandatory existence of at least one independent director appointed by
minority investors.210 Finally, members of the audit committee should
have enough time in the monitoring of the company’s auditors and
financial matters. Indeed, while “busy directors” can be beneficial for
certain functions and companies,211 members of the audit committee
need to spend time interacting with the auditor and the company’s
accounting team, as well as assessing the company’s financial policies.
Therefore, this work can be time consuming. Thus, along with
independence and expertise, availability and commitment are
additional pillars of an effective audit committee.
C. Enhancing the Internal Governance of Audit Firms
As discussed above in subpart IID, scandals such as Enron show
that the functional gatekeeper is often not the audit firm as a whole,
but the key engagement partner or a small group that audits a firm

206. See Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 88; Gurrea-Martínez, supra note 194.
207. See Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 88; Gurrea-Martinez, supra note 194.
208. On the increasing role of institutional investors, see, e.g., John C. Coates, IV
Thirty Years of Evolution in the Roles of Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance,
in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SHAREHOLDER POWER 79–98 (Jennifer Hill et al. eds. 2015);
Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist
Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863 (2013).
209. See Armour et al., supra note 192, at 40; Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 88;
Gutierrez & Saez, supra note 192, at 63; Ringe, supra note 192, at 401; Varottil, supra
note 192, at 281.
210. See Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 88; Gurrea-Martínez, supra note 194.
211. See Alexander Ljungqvist & Konrad Raff, Busy Directors: Strategic
Interaction and Monitoring Synergies 38–40 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 23889, 2017) (finding that the cumulating of directorships need not
necessarily harm firms if there are positive monitoring synergies); see also Stephen P.
Ferris, Narayanan Jayaraman & Min-Yu (Stella) Liao, Better Directors or Distracted
Directors? An International Analysis of Busy Boards (Georgia Inst. of Tech. Scheller Coll.
of Bus., Research Paper No. 17–30, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3012820
[https://perma.cc/T2QW-8V2Q] (archived Feb. 10, 2020).
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and develops the relationship with that client. The hypothetical
interests of the accounting firm as a whole are not entirely absorbed by
these individuals, even if they are partners, thus leading to an internal
agency problem.212 While the audit firm as a whole may have stronger
incentives to maintain high standards of independence and audit
quality, this may not necessarily be true for individuals within the
firm.213 Reforms relating to rotation and nonaudit services therefore
fail if they do not tackle this issue.
There are a number of factors at play that influence the incentives
of individual auditors. On the one hand, individual partners may be
more easily captured by an individual client because he obtains only a
small percentage of the firm’s profit and loss. On the other hand, in a
large firm, partners may be well-positioned to monitor each other (for
which they might have incentives because of personal liability), and
they may be in a good position to put internal control in place. 214
Arguably, with the establishment of consulting in audit firms, audit
partners and the firm’s consulting divisions became natural allies that
often were more powerful than the accounting firm’s internal audit
division.215
In addition, while accounting firms today form international
groups, they are not global partnerships. Each of the four networks is
organized around either a UK Company limited by guarantee or a
Swiss cooperative, of which its national units (sometimes several in a
country) are members.216 The coordinating entities provide some
common standards across countries, but their partners in the country
in question own the national affiliates.217 Obviously, separate national
structures are necessary because of differing national regulatory
requirements. The national units are separate in terms of liability and
regulatory sanctions, but it is less clear what effects reputational
incidents have. While the Anderson network unraveled worldwide
after Enron, a localized scandal in one of the networks would likely not
have any impact beyond the country in question. One lesson is that it
is difficult to generalize about the effectiveness of sanctions or agency
conflicts within these firms. The interests of firms within one network

212. See supra notes 108–112 and accompanying text.
213. See Kraakman, Gatekeepers, supra note 35, at 71–72 (“larger firms obviously
make more reliable gatekeepers”); Miller, supra note 111, at 78 (suggesting that an
engagement partner may not report errors because of the utility received from the client).
For empirical results, see Choi et al., supra note 95; Francis et al., supra note 95; see also
Honigsberg, supra note 112.
214. See Kraakman, Gatekeepers, supra note 35, at 72.
215. See Coffee, Understanding Enron, supra note 41, at 1415.
216. See Hannah L. Buxbaum, The Viability of Enterprise Jurisdiction: A Case
Study of the Big Four Accounting Firms, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1769, 1796–97 (2015).
217. See id. at 1803–07.
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may sometimes diverge, but likely not enough to alleviate concerns
that the connection can sometimes create a conflict of interest.218
What can legislatures and regulators do to improve incentives for
individual auditors? One option is to prosecute them in cases of
wrongdoing rather than the firm as a whole, which has already
happened in a number of cases.219 Starting from the premise that firms
will not fully resolve internal agency problems themselves, they may
also be content with a settlement with prosecutors or regulators that
might actually expose a partner to criminal liability. 220 However,
generally it appears that individual partners should have more “skin
in the game.”
Reform in this area could rest on multiple strategies. First, one
possibility would be to strengthen incentives for partners to monitor
each other. Large accounting firms are rarely unlimited liability
entities such as general partnerships today, but rather LLPs in the
United States or corporations in some other countries. 221 Arguably,
this could undercut incentives for partners to monitor each other.
Going back to unlimited liability is likely unfeasible politically,
especially after the trend toward limited liability during past decades.
In fact, the main reason for the spread of the LLP in professional
services firms in the United States was the concern about being held
liable for the negligence one has possibly never even met. 222 Moreover,
partners typically need to make a considerable equity investment to
join a firm; the risk of losing this share should in theory create a
monitoring incentive already.223

218. Art. 1(2) of the EU Audit Directive provides an expansive definition of
“network”, to which both the Directive and the Audit Regulation attach consequences in
the context of independence requirements. See EU Audit Regulation, supra note 11; EU
Audit Directive, supra notes 7 and 9, at art. 1(2).
219. See, e.g., Cunningham, supra note 54, at 1700–01 (discussing criminal
investigations against KPMG in 2005).
220. See Asaf Eckstein & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Reverse Agency Problem in
the Age of Compliance 26–43 (Univ. of Penn. Inst. for L. & Econ. Research, Paper No.
19–38,
2019),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3460064
[https://perma.cc/F559-ZFKK]
(archived Feb. 10, 2020).
221. For example, in Germany, § 27 Wirtschaftsprüferordnung (WPO) permits any
type of registered business association. Wirtschaftsprüferordnung [WPO] [Auditor
Order]
June
17,
2016,
§
27
(Ger.),
https://www.wpk.de/uploads/tx_templavoila/WPO_02.pdf [https://perma.cc/4YSN-4J7B]
(archived Feb. 11, 2020).
222. See LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION 127 (2010); Robert
W. Hamilton, Registered Limited Liability Partnerships: Present at the Birth (Nearly), 66
U. COLO. L. REV. 1065, 1066 (1995).
223. See Clive Lennox & Bing Li, The consequences of protecting audit partners’
personal assets from the threat of liability, 54 J. ACCT. & ECON. 154 (2012) (finding that
switching to LLP status had no effect on audit quality in the UK, and that switches were
likely introduced by the cost of the exposure of partners’ personal assets to risk).
Arguably, “enterprise liability” that treats different units of a Big Four network as jointly
and severally liable could set further incentives for mutual monitoring. However, it does
not eliminate each firms’ partners limited liability. See generally Buxbaum, supra note
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Second, one could think about tweaking incompatibilities and
prohibitions. Auditor independence rules already often apply to
individual partners working in audit teams or in the chain of command
above them.224 However, the effectiveness of incompatibilities is
sometimes limited. For example, both US law and EU law establish a
“cooling-off period” for the employment of former employees of the
accounting firm in an audit client.225 The difficulty here is that this
prohibition is only effective if the audit firm remains the same; it does
not prevent the audit client from rewarding one of the auditor’s
employees with a lucrative job offer if the audit firm is a different one
in the next year.
Third, regulators could strengthen individual sanctions, such as
personal financial penalties, the possibility of losing the license as a
CPA, or a prohibition against working in the financial industry after a
regulatory finding of wrongdoing. However, relatively remote
sanctions might not exert a sufficient deterrent effect compared to the
more immediate benefits resulting from the relationship with the
client.
Fourth, and most importantly, regulators should consider how
remuneration is structured within audit firms. In the United States,
under the Securities and Exchange Commission’s independence
requirements, an audit firm is not considered independent if “any audit
partner earns or receives compensation based on the audit partner
procuring engagements with that audit client to provide any products
or services other than audit, review or attest services.”226 The EU
Audit Directive requires
adequate remuneration policies, including profit-sharing policies, providing
sufficient performance incentives to secure audit quality. In particular, the
amount of revenue that the statutory auditor or the audit firm derives from
providing non-audit services to the audited entity shall not form part of the

216, at 1819–28 (discussing the viability of enterprise liability in multinational
accounting firms).
224. See, e.g., Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(f)(8), (11) (2020) (defining
“chain of command” and “covered person” in the context of audit independence
requirements).
225. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 206, 116 Stat. 745
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7232) (prohibiting public accounting firms from auditing issuers
if individuals in certain leading financial positions with the audit client were previously
employed in the audit firm and participated in an audit of the issuer during a one-year
period before the initiation of the audit); Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(c)(2)(iii)
(2020) (prohibiting employment of former employees, shareholders and partners of the
accounting firm at the audit client under certain circumstances); EU Audit Directive ,
supra notes 7 and 9, at art. 42(3) (prohibiting the key audit partner from taking a key
management position in the audited firm for two years).
226. Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(c)(8) (2020); see also Strengthening the
Commission’s Requirements Regarding Auditor Independence, Exchange Act Release
No. 33-8183 (May 6, 2003) (introducing this provision into Regulation S-X in 2003).
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performance evaluation and remuneration of any person involved in, or able to
influence the carrying out of, the audit.227

In addition, the EU Audit Regulation, in the audit of public interest
entities, prohibits contingent fees.228
While these rules go a long way, they do not change the
expectation inside accounting firms to develop a particular client
relationship over the years, success at which will likely result in
professional advancement within the firm and long-term growth of
compensation.229 In large law firms in the United States, senioritybased, lock-step compensation systems have, since the 1980s, given
way to systems where partner remuneration is based on individual
contributions to the firm’s profits, and partners can be de-equitized if
they fail to generate revenue.230
Accounting firms around the world use a variety of compensation
systems for partners, making comparisons difficult. Generally,
compensation systems involve two choices. First, how many partners
should be included in a profit pool (e.g., should a pool include all
auditors in a particular local office, or all in the country)? Second, to
what extent should the profit pool be divided equally? Within each pool,
should some of the compensation vary by individual performance? 231
Firms have their own reasons for setting up a particular system. Less
variability and larger pools mean that risks (e.g., liability) are shared
among a larger set of partners. 232 This is utility increasing ex post if
partners are risk averse, but it reduces their incentive to avoid liability
because it will be socialized.233 More variability and smaller pools set
greater incentives to increase profits, but may make individual
partners more susceptible to client demands.234 It may also reward
partners for taking risky clients because the risk will be borne by the
entire firm.235
Data about compensation systems are hard to come by, but
research from several European countries suggests that partners’
compensation is positively associated with the size of the client

227. EU Audit Directive, supra notes 7 and 9, at art. 24a(1)(j).
228. EU Audit Regulation, supra note 11, at art. 4(1).
229. See Gadinis & Mangels, supra note 27, at 815.
230. See Francis, supra note 23, at 362; Kim, supra note 34, at 432–33.
231. See Jürgen Ernstberger et al., Are Audit Firms’ Compensation Policies
Associated With Audit Quality?, CONT. ACCT. RES. (forthcoming 2020).
232. See Simunic, supra note 138, at 678–79.
233. See id.
234. See, e.g., Geoff Burrows & Christopher Black, Profit Sharing in Australian
Big 6 Accounting Firms: An Exploratory Study, 23 ACCT. ORG. & SOC. 517, 519–21 (1998);
Greg Trompeter, The Effect of Partner Compensation Schemes and Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles on Audit Partner Judgement, 13 AUDITING: J. PRAC. & THEORY 56,
57 (1994).
235. See Francis, supra note 23, at 362–63.
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portfolio and the acquisition of new clients.236 Larger accounting firms
tend to have more variable compensation practices (presumably
because they are less in need of risk-sharing), but ceteris paribus more
variable compensation is associated with lower audit quality
(especially in medium-size firms).237
Any regulatory intervention in compensation systems intended to
improve audit independence and quality would have to struggle with
balancing the goals of risk-sharing and incentivizing partners to
perform with the possible risk of creating a pressure-cooker
atmosphere to maximize revenue by pleasing clients. Moreover,
regulation of fee systems needs to grapple with the difficulty of taking
into account that firms at least implicitly reward partners for acquiring
new clients. Even if regulation mandated a firm-wide pool using a
lockstep or sharing system, presumably the prospective ability to
acquire new clients would be taken into account when firms invite a
prospective new partner to join. The same is true for reforms requiring
the inclusion of variable compensations not based on profit making (but
instead based on, for example, internal audit quality reviews, which
recent European research suggests that may mitigate negative
incentive effects238).
Consequently, reforms should preferably not require accounting
firms to implement a sharing system that excludes performanceoriented components more consistently than at present. 239 Sensible
reform should emphasize increased transparency of compensation
systems and their incentive effects. In many countries, audit firms
already have to publish “transparency reports” (e.g., under Art. 40 of
the EU Audit Directive). Under Art. 40, audit firms already must,
among other things, annually disclose their legal structure and
ownership, as well as what internal measures they undertake to
ensure independence.240 They must disclose “information concerning
the basis for the partners’ remuneration.”241 However, the actual

236. See W. Robert Knechtel, Lasse Niemi & Mikko Zerni, Empirical Evidence on
the Implicit Determinants of Compensation in Big 4 Audit Partnerships, 51 J ACCT. RES.
34 (2013) (researching Sweden).
237. See Marie-Laure Vandenhaute et al., Professional and Commercial Incentives
in Audit Firms: Evidence on Partner Compensation, EUR. ACCT. REV. (forthcoming 2020)
(researching Belgium); Ernstberger et al., supra note 231 (researching Germany).
238. See Vandenhaute et al., supra note 237.
239. We are skeptical about the idea of going further into the direction of explicit
performance-based compensation. See Hannes, supra note 39, at 420–34 (proposing the
issuance of restricted stock to auditors combined with mandatory rotation). First, the
proposal requires the implementation of mandatory rotation, which entails a number of
problems discussed above in section III.B. Second, the restriction period would have to
be long enough to ensure that the auditor accounting fraud would be uncovered during
the time. This would make a considerable part of the auditor’s compensation depend on
business risk that (unlike for managers) is completely outside the auditor’s control.
240. EU Audit Directive, supra notes 7 and 9, at art. 40(1)(a), (g).
241. Id. at art. 40(1)(j).
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transparency reports are often rather general on this particular point
and may include a few paragraphs that explain that there are fixed
and variable components of partner compensation. 242 While audit
firms have to list public interest clients, they are not required to list
engagement partners for each of them.243
These transparency reports are in principle a valuable regulatory
instrument that has the potential to strengthen auditor independence.
While the disclosure of individual partner compensation might conflict
with privacy law principles in many countries, reforms should aim at
precisely specifying how firms use performance-based metrics to
calculate partner compensation, and at requiring firms to explain what
profit pools they use for nonvariable components. Transparency
reports should also include lists of engagement partners for each
publicly traded audit client in their report. 244 In addition, if the audit
firm provides any nonaudit services to such audit client, the
responsible partners for these services and the amount of fees received
for such services should be disclosed as well as audit fees. The ability
to gauge responsibilities for each client would enable investors to
better judge the value of an audit report.
VI. CONCLUSION
Auditors play a major role in corporate governance and capital
markets. Ex ante, auditors facilitate firms’ access to finance by creating
trust among public investors. Ex post, auditors can prevent
misbehavior and prevent financial fraud by corporate insiders. In order
to fulfill these goals, however, in addition to having the adequate
knowledge and expertise, auditors should perform their functions in an
independent manner. Unfortunately, for a variety of reasons, including
the possibility of providing nonaudit services or the fact of being hired
and paid by the audited company, auditors face a clear conflict of
interest. Therefore, even if they eventually act independently,

242. See Rogier Deumes et al., Audit Firm Governance: Do Transparency Reports
Reveal Audit Quality?, 31 AUDITING: J. PRAC. & THEORY 193 (2011) (finding no
association between more detailed transparency reports and audit quality).
243. See EU Audit Directive, supra notes 7 and 9, at art. 40(1)(f).
244. In the US, accounting firms have been required to disclose the names of
engagement partners, but not their compensation. See Improving the Transparency of
Audits: Rules to Require Disclosure of Certain Audit Participants on a New PCAOB
Form and Related Amendments to Auditing Standards, PCAOB Release No. 2015-008
(Dec. 15, 2015), https://pcaobus.org/Rulemaking/Docket029/Release-2015-008.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SBQ6-M9Y6] (archived Feb. 10, 2020); Order Granting Approval of
Proposed Rules to Require Disclosure of Certain Audit Participants on a New PCAOB
Form and Related Amendments to Auditing Standards, SEC Release No. 34-77787 (May
9, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/rules/pcaob/2016/34-77787.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YRQYVGV] (archived Feb. 10, 2020) (approving the PCAOB rule).
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investors have incentives to think otherwise. And if so, this lack of
trust must be translated in an overall increase of a firm’s cost of capital.
It has been argued that the existence of various market failures,
including asymmetries of information and negative externalities
potentially created by audit failure, justify a regulatory intervention,
especially in the context of the auditor independence. The existing
literature has attempted to solve the auditor’s independence puzzle
through a variety of mechanisms, including prohibitions, rotation, or
more recently breaking up of audit firms or empowerment of public
investors. This Article has highlighted flaws and limitations of all of
these regulatory responses. For this reason, this Article has proposed
a new model to solve the auditors’ independence puzzle, which includes
a system of majority-of-the-minority approval for the appointment of
auditors in controlled firms, combined with a stronger role for public
investors in the audit committee and increased transparency and
disclosure obligations about the internal governance and compensation
system of audit firms. Given the tradeoffs inherent in the regulatory
choices at hand, the proposal is therefore intended to strengthen
decision-making by investors and thus the possibility of a certain level
of firm-specific choices.

